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I. Introduction 
 
 A. Historical Background 
 
The concept of limitation of liability has always played an important role in marine 
ventures; however, limitation did not become a feature of English Admiralty law 
until 1734.1 The extent of a shipowner’s liability was not merely a domestic issue 
between the shipper and carrier; for instance, ship investors sought clarity for 
maximum liabilities associated with a marine disaster; freight rates for cargo 
interests were based upon estimates of potential liability; and P&I Club rates for 
marine insurance depended upon the exposure to certain risks associated with perils 
of the sea.2 Throughout history many sea-trading nations faced questions of how or 
even whether a shipowner should be allowed to limit certain liabilities. In the 18th 
century, the British Empire conducted much of the world’s sea-trade and the English 
Parliament bowed to the continued requests of shipowners by passing the first of a 
sequence of statutes limiting a shipowners’ liability.3 The preamble of the 
Responsibility of Shipowners Act gave credence to the importance of limitation by 
stating: 
‘of the greatest consequence and importance to this Kingdom, to 
promote the increase of the number of ships and vessels, and to 
prevent any discouragement to merchants and others from being 
interested and concerned therein.’4 
 
In 1854, the English passed the Merchant Shipping Act which relieved 
shipowners from liability for acts of their master and crew done without ‘privity or 
knowledge’ of the owner to the extent of the value of the ship, its equipment and 
freight to be earned prior to the accident causing damage.5 By the end of the 19th 
century, England had collated its limitation statutes into the single measure of § 503 
of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, which is almost exactly mirrored in § 261 of 
the South African Merchant Shipping Act, 1951.6 The South African Merchant 
Shipping Act, 1951 embraced the notion of limitation and recognized the principle 
                                                
1  Schoenbaum, 2 Admiralty & Mar. Law § 15-1 (4th ed. 2004). 
2  Hare, Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, Chp. 11, p.380 
(1999). 
3  Id. at 384. 
4  Responsibility of Shipowners Act, 7 Geo 2c 15 (1734). 
5  Schoenbaum, 2 Admiralty & Mar. Law § 15-1 (4th ed. 2004). 
6  Hare, Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, Chp. 11, p.384 
(1999). 
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‘that in the interests of encouraging sea-bound trade and enterprise, a shipowner 
should be protected in a given amount, save where he has been at fault.’7 
The United States was also forced to address issues relating to limitation of 
liability for its’ merchant fleet. The English Law of Limitation of Liability was 
initially adopted in state statutes enacted in Maine and Massachusetts, but there was 
no general law of limitation under United States federal admiralty law.8 Then, in 
1848, the case of New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants’ Bank9 resulted in 
holding a shipowner fully liable for the loss of cargo, despite a contractual provision 
limiting the vessel’s liability.10 American shipowners responded by lobbying the 
United States Congress to find a workable solution balancing the rights of those 
parties participating in sea-bound trade. In the meanwhile, American shipowners 
were experiencing a competitive disadvantage to their English brethren and were 
being exposed to the full force of their potential liability.11 As a result, the United 
States Congress passed the Limitation of Liability Act12 for the purpose of 
encouraging the development of American merchant shipping.13 
The scope of this dissertation analyzes the current limitation practices and 
procedures of both the South Africa and the United States in the context of a global 
initiative to unify limitation regimes through the ratification of international 
conventions.  
 




The Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability Act14 was passed by Congress in 1851.15 
The fundamental purpose of the Act was to limit the liability of a shipowner for any 
                                                
7  Hare, Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, Chp. 11, p.382 
(1999); Citing – The Nagos 1996 (2) SA at 271 (N). 
8  Schoenbaum, 2 Admiralty & Mar. Law § 15-1 (4th ed. 2004). 
9  New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants’ Bank, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344, 12 
L.Ed. 465 (1848). 
10  Schoenbaum, 2 Admiralty & Mar. Law § 15-1 (4th ed. 2004). 
11  Landrieu, Stipulations: Sidestepping the Limitation of Shiponwers’ Liability Act, 
23 Tul. Mar. Law. 429 (1999). 
12  Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635, previously codified at 46 U.S.C. § 181-189. 
13  Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147, 150 (1957). 
14  Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635, previously codified at 46 U.S.C. § 181-189.  
15  Robertson and Sturley, Recent Developments in Admiralty and Maritime Law at the 
National Level and in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, 31 Tul. Mar.L.J. 463, 470 
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casualty during a voyage of his vessel where losses arose from circumstances 
beyond his control. The objective of the limitation Act was to bring United States 
law into line with that of Great Britain and other nations whose laws protected their 
shipowners.16 A fundamental provision in the Act declares, ‘the liability for any 
damage arising from a disaster at sea which is occasioned without the privity or 
knowledge of the shipowner shall in no case exceed the value of the vessel at fault 
together with her pending freight.’17  
In essence, the Limitation Act provides a defense for shipowners in suits 
arising from a maritime casualty involving property damage and/or personal injury 
and allows the vessel owner to limit its liability. Limitation may be invoked either as 
a defense to an action seeking damages or as an independent complaint in 
admiralty.18 The defense hinges on the vessel owner being free from fault for the 
accident and the vessel owner must not have knowledge or privity of any negligence 
of the vessel’s master, crew or managing agent of the vessel owner which caused the 
casualty.19 The inherent purpose of the Limitation Act was not to insulate 
shipowners from liability, but rather to limit their liability to the value of the vessel 
at the voyage’s end plus her pending freight – commonly referred to as the 
limitation fund.20 
B. Persons Entitled to Limit Liability 
 
The operative provision of the Limitation Act 46 U.S.C. § 30502 applies ‘to 
seagoing vessels and vessels used on lakes or rivers or in inland navigation, 
including canal boats, barges, and lighters.’21 The term ‘owner’22 is defined to 
                                                                                                                                    
(Summer 2007). The recodification of United States Code Title 46 was passed on 
September 13, 2007 when the full U.S. Senate and House of Representatives passed 
the bill. None of the changes in the new recodification were intended to have any 
substantive significance. 
16  In Re Vatican Shrimp Co., 820 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1987); Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 
383, 61 S.Ct. 687, 85 L. Ed. 906 (1941). 
17  Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147, 150 (1957). 
18  Limitation can be plead as a defense in a state court action; Langes v. Green, 282 
U.S. 531 (1931); In Re Complaint of Vatican Shrimp Co., 820 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 
1987). 
19  46 U.S.C. § 30506(e). 
20  Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147, 150 (1957); 46 U.S.C. § 30511. 
21  46 U.S.C. § 30502 was previously codified as 46 U.S.C. § 183(a). Section 183(a) 
provides for limitation by ‘the owner of any vessel, whether American or foreign.’ 
The words ‘whether American or foreign’ were omitted as unnecessary because of § 
30502 of the revised title. 
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include ‘a charterer that mans, supplies, and navigates a vessel at the charterer’s own 
expense or by the charterer’s own procurement.’23 This has been interpreted to mean 
a demise and bareboat charterer, but not a time or voyage charterer.24  
 In addition, the United States government as a vessel owner may limit 
liability under the Limitation Act. The same standards of determining privity and 
knowledge apply to the United States as apply to a private shipowner.25  Foreign 
vessel owners26 are also entitled to the benefit of limitation of liability.27  
C. Additional Protections Afforded to a Shipowner Invoking the 
Limitation Act 
The Limitation Act creates a procedure whereby a shipowner’s liability for certain 
claims may be limited to the ‘value of the interest of such owner in the vessel’ – the 
value at the termination of the voyage – and ‘freight then pending’ – freight monies 
earned by the vessel owner during the voyage.28 More importantly, the Limitation 
Act provides the vessel owner with a single forum for determining: (1) whether the 
vessel and its owner are liable at all; (2) whether the owner may in fact limit liability 
to the value of the vessel and pending freight; (3) the amount of just claims; and (4) 
                                                                                                                                    
22  The term “owner” is not limited to title ownership. Owner under the Limitation Act 
is a “liberal, common sense” determination. Complaint of Nobles, 842 F.Supp. 1430 
(N.D. Fla. 1993); See also Marine Recreational Opportunities, Inc. v. Berman, 15 
F.3d 270 (2nd Cir. 1994) (owner is someone with either title or actual control over 
the vessel). 
23  46 U.S.C. § 30501. Section 30501 was previously codified as 46 U.S.C. § 186 
which defined an owner to include an owner pro hac vice which by its terms 
includes “the charterer of any vessel who actually ‘mans, victuals, and navigates’ 
such vessel at his own expense, or by his own procurement…” 
24  Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th ed. (2002) – Bareboat Charter is a charter under which 
the shipowner provides the ship, and the charterer provides the personnel, 
insurance, and other material necessary to operate it - also termed demise charter. 
25  Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas S. A. v. United States, 730 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 
1984). 
26  46 U.S.C. § 30502; Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., v. Mellor, 233 U.S. 718, 731-
32, 34 S.Ct. 754, 58 L.Ed. 1171 (1914) [The Titanic Case]. 
27  In the case of The Norwalk Victory, the Supreme Court held that when a claim is 
brought by a foreign shipowner, the U.S. courts must decide whether a foreign law 
cap is applicable by determining whether, under foreign law, the cap is substantive 
or procedural in nature.  The district court in Nigeria National Petroleum Corp. v. 
S/V Seabulk Merlin held that Nigeria’s foreign law cap was procedural and hence 
inapplicable in the limitation of liability proceeding - citing: Robertson and Sturley, 
Recent Developments in Admiralty and Maritime Law at the National Level and in 
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, 31 Tul. Mar.L.J. 463, 611 (Summer 2007).  
28  46 U.S.C. § 30505; Schoenbaum, 2 Admiralty & Mar. Law § 15-5 at 144 (4th ed. 
2004). 
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how the fund should be distributed to the claimants.29 The Limitation Act vests 
exclusive jurisdiction in the admiralty courts and is designed to preserve the 
shipowner’s right to limit its liability in a federal forum.30 The procedure is 
governed by the Limitation Act itself and Rule F of the Admiralty Rules.31  
When certain property damage or personal injury claims are filed against the 
vessel owner, the admiralty court has jurisdiction to determine if those claims will 
exceed the ‘value of the vessel plus her pending freight’ so that a concursus of 
claimants may be established. The purpose of the concursus is to assure that all 
persons having claims against the vessel must file within the limitation proceeding 
so the court can protect the competing interests of the shipowner and the claimant. 
The objective of the concursus is to provide an orderly distribution of an inadequate 
limitation fund among claimants.32 
D. The Requirements for a Shipowner to be entitled to Limitation of 
Liability 
 
It is a fundamental prerequisite that a shipowner may limit his liability only upon 
showing that the fault causing the loss occurred without his ‘privity or knowledge.’33 
Privity or knowledge can be best understood as the following: 
‘Privity or knowledge does not necessarily require a showing of 
actual knowledge. It is deemed to exist if the shipowner has the 
means of obtaining knowledge, or if he would have obtained the 
knowledge by reasonable inspection. Knowledge is not only what the 
shipowner knows, but what he is charged with discovering.’34 
 
‘Privity or knowledge refers to the vessel owner’s personal 
participation in, or actual or constructive35 knowledge of, the specific 
                                                
29  46 U.S.C. § 30505; Schoenbaum, 2 Admiralty & Mar. Law § 15-5 at 144 (4th ed. 
2004). 
30  Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147, 150 (1957). 
31  Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. Rule F. 
32  In Re Tidewater Inc., 249 F.3d 342 (5th Cir. 2001), citing Texaco v. Williams, 47 
F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 1995). 
33  46 U.S.C. § 30505. 
34  Brister v. A.W.I. Inc., 946 F.2d 350, 358 (5th Cir. 1991). 
35  Constructive knowledge refers to not what the vessel owner actually knew, but 
what it should have known. The shipowner is chargeable with knowledge of acts or 
conditions of unseaworthiness that could have been discovered through reasonable 
diligence; Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas S. A. v. United States, 730 F.2d 
153 (4th Cir. 1984). 
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acts of negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness which caused or 
contributed to the accident.’36 
 
An important facet of the Limitation Act is that privity or knowledge may be 
imputed to the vessel owner if the claimant can show privity or knowledge on the 
part of the owner’s managing agent, officer, or supervising employee (including 
shoreside personnel).37  
A determination of whether a shipowner may limit liability involves a two-
step analysis: (1) a determination of what acts of negligence or unseaworthiness 
caused the casualty and (2) whether the shipowner had knowledge or privity of these 
acts.38 For instance, a claimant must establish that the injury or loss was caused by 
the negligence and/or unseaworthiness of the vessel.39 If the causal connection 
requirement is met, then the burden of proof shifts to the vessel owner to prove that 
no design, neglect, privity or knowledge of the negligent action or unseaworthy 
condition may be imputed to the vessel owner.40  
In some cases, a presumption exists that the owner had privity or knowledge. 
Under § 30506(e), the privity or knowledge of the master or the owner’s 
superintendent or managing agent, at or before the beginning of each voyage, is 
imputed to the owner.41 Another presumption arises if the accident was caused by an 
unseaworthy condition which existed at the start of the voyage. For example, when 
the vessel owner is charged with the absolute, non-delegable duty to provide a 
seaworthy vessel, he is also charged with a duty to use reasonable means to acquire 
knowledge of conditions likely to produce or contribute to unseaworthiness. 
There has been an unmistakable trend in the judicial decisions to interpret 
the ‘privity or knowledge’ requirement of the Limitation Act as imposing a heavy 
                                                
36  In Re Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 55 F.Supp. 2d 1367, 1370 (S.D. Fl. 1999), 
aff’d. 214 F.3d 1356 (11th Cir. 2000), citing Hercules Carriers, Inc., 768 F.2d 1558, 
1563-64 (11th Cir. 1985). 
37  In Re Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 55 F.Supp. 2d 1367, 1370 (S.D. Fl. 1999), 
aff’d. 214 F.3d 1356, 1371 (11th Cir. 2000), 
38  Id. at 1369. 
39  The initial burden of proving negligence or unseaworthiness is on the claimant: In 
Re Complaint of Garda Marine, Inc., 1192 AMC 1307 (S.D. Fla. 1991). 
40  Schoenfeld, Limitation of Liability: The Defense Perspective, 28 Tul. Mar. Law. 
219 (Summer, 2004) at note 23. 
41  46 U.S.C. § 30506(e). 
  7 
burden on shipowners and charterers to exercise a high degree of control and 
supervision so as to avoid marine casualties.42 
E. What Types of Vessels are afforded the Benefits of Limiting 
Liability? 
 
The Limitation Act applies to ‘all seagoing vessels, and also all vessels used on 
lakes or rivers or in inland navigation, including canal boats, barges, and lighters.’43 
Courts have interpreted this clause to apply to all vessels; however, to be a vessel, 
the structure must have, to a reasonable degree, the purpose of transportation.44 
Another related definition of a vessel is found in 1 U.S.C.S. § 3 which states “a 
‘vessel’ includes every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, 
or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.”45 
 Some examples of particular crafts or structures considered vessels include 
barges46, fishing vessels47, scows, special purpose vessels such as semi-submersible 
drilling rigs48, ferry boats49, derrick boats50, canal boats, tug boats, yachts51 and even 
small pleasure craft,52 in the form of ‘jet skis’53 have been held to be entitled to 
limitation. 
 Certain structures have also been held to be outside the protections afforded 
by the Limitation Act.54 For example, a seaplane is not considered a vessel within 
the context of § 30502.55 Similarly, a floating dry dock used in the repair of vessels 
is not a ‘vessel’ with the meaning of the Limitation Act.56  
                                                
42  Schoenbaum, 2 Admiralty & Mar. Law § 15-6 at 154 (4th ed. 2004). 
43  46 U.S.C. § 30502. 
44  Schoenbaum, 2 Admiralty & Mar. Law § 15-2 at 139 (4th ed. 2004). 
45  1 U.S.C.S. § 3 (2005). 
46  Re Myers Excursion & Nav. Co., 57 F. 240 (N.Y. D.C. 1893). 
47  Whitcomb v. Emerson, 50 F. 128 (DC Mass. 1892). 
48  In Re Sedco, Inc., 543 F.Supp. 561, 1982 AMC 1461 (S.D. Tex. 1982) 
49  Grays Landing Ferry Co. v. Stone, 46 F.2d 394 (CA3 Pa 1931).  
50  Patton-Tully Transp. Co. v. Turner, 269 F. 334 (CA6 Tenn 1920).  
51  Keller v. Jennette, 940 F.Supp. 35 (D.Mass. 1996); In Re Bernstein, 81 F.Supp. 2d 
176 (D.Mass. 1999). 
52  Armour v. Gradler, 448 F. Supp. 741 (W.D. Pa. 1978); The Limitation Act applies 
to the operation of small pleasure craft on navigable waters even if the craft is not 
used for commercial purposes. 
53  In Re Keys Jet Ski, Inc., 893 F.2d 1225 (11th Cir. 1990).  
54  46 U.S.C. § 30501 et seq. 
55  Seaplane is not a “vessel” so as to enable the owner to limit its liability; Hubschman 
v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 828 (D.V.I. 1977). 
56  Berton v. Tietien & Lang Dry Dock Co., 219 F. 763 (D.C. NJ 1915); De Martino v. 
Bethlehem Steel Co., 164 F.2d 177 (CA Mass. 1947). 
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Although the Limitation Act appears to define ‘vessels’ as including a wide 
variety of crafts and/or structures, most courts have had no trouble identifying what 
particular types of structures and/or crafts are to be considered vessels for limitation 
purposes. 
III. The United States Procedure for Filing for Limitation of Liability under the 
Admiralty Rules 
 
 A. Jurisdiction and Venue 
One of the major purposes of the limitation proceeding is to establish a single forum 
for adjudication of claims and to create a concursus to resolve competing claims 
against the limitation fund.57 Jurisdiction of limitation proceedings is exclusively in 
the federal district courts.58 State courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction to hear 
limitation issues under the savings-to-suitors clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1333.59 The 
procedure for filing for limitation of liability is controlled by the Limitation Act 
itself and Rule F of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime 
Claims.60 
Venue is proper in any district where the vessel has been attached or arrested 
or, if there has been no attachment or arrest, in the district where the owner has been 
sued.61 If suit has not yet been commenced against the owner, the limitation 
complaint may be filed in any district where the vessel is physically present, or if the 
vessel is not within any district, the complaint may be filed in any district.62 Where a 
claim has been filed against a vessel in state court, the appropriate venue in a 
limitation action under Rule F(9) is the federal court which encompasses the state 
court.63 
Furthermore, once a vessel owner files for limitation within the federal 
district court, the vessel owner waives the right to later object to the federal court’s 
jurisdiction.64 For example, in Karim v. Finch Shipping Co., a foreign seaman filed a 
                                                
57  Langes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 540 (1931). 
58  Norwich & New York Transp. Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. 104 (1871). 
59  In Re Vatican Shrimp Co., 820 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1987). 
60  Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule F; Schoenbaum, 2 Admiralty & Mar. Law § 15-5 at 144 (4th ed. 
2004). 
61  Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule F(9). 
62  Id.; In Re Complaint of Mike’s, Inc., 317 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 2003). 
63  In Re Matter of American River Transp. Co., 864 F. Supp 554 (E.D. La. 1994). 
64  Karim v. Finch Shipping Co. Inc., 265 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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state court personal injury suit.65 In response, the shipping company filed a 
limitation proceeding in the federal court.66 The state court later dismissed the 
seaman’s case for lack of personal jurisdiction over the shipping company.67 While 
the limitation proceeding was still pending, the shipping company attempted to 
dismiss it’s limitation proceeding from federal court on the basis of lack of personal 
jurisdiction.68 The court held that the company had submitted itself to the 
jurisdiction of the federal court by filing for limitation.69 
B. Time for Filing a Claim 
A vessel owner wishing to limit liability must file a limitation proceeding in the 
United States District Court within six months after receiving written notice of a 
claim against it.70 Written notice may take the form of an actual lawsuit; however, 
any writing expressing an intention71 to bring a claim may suffice as sufficient 
notice to commence the six-month tolling period of the Limitation Act.72 On the 
other hand, the adequacy of the written notice is very fact-dependent such that if the 
claimant misidentifies the vessel on which the accident is alleged to have occurred, 
the six-month period may not have begun to run.73  
Once a vessel owner files a complaint for limitation of liability, the vessel 
owner must also: 
‘deposit with the court, for the benefit of claimants, an amount equal 
to the value of the owner’s interest in the vessel and pending freight, 
or approved security, and in addition to such amounts, or approved 
security therefore, as the court may from time to time fix as 
necessary.’74 
                                                
65  Karim v. Finch Shipping Co. Inc., 265 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2001). 
66  Id. 
67  Id. at 261. 
68  Id. at 262. 
69  Id. at 268. 
70  46 U.S.C. § 30511. See also, 3-II Benedict on Admiralty § 15 Time for Instituting 
Limitation Proceedings and Other Actions. 
71  Complaint of Tom-Mac, Inc., 76 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 1996) - where the owner receives 
notice of a ‘reasonable possibility’ that a claim has or will be made against the 
vessel, the six-month tolling period commences. 
72  Doxsee Sea Clam Co. Inc. v. Brown, 13 F.3d 550 (2nd Cir. 1994) - holding that a 
letter from a claimant’s attorney is sufficient to begin the six-month tolling period; 
Distinguished by In Re Salty Sons Sports Fishing, 191 F.Supp. 2d 631 (D. Md. 
2002) - holding that correspondence from claimant’s attorney to vessel owners 
which did not inform the owners of the claimants’ demand, blame the vessel 
owners for loss, or inform the owners that the damages might exceed the value of 
the vessel did not trigger the time limitation. 
73  Billiot v. Dolphin Services, Inc., 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 21424 (5th Cir. 2000). 
74  46 U.S.C. § 30511(b)(1). 
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The court will require the vessel owner to deposit security in a sum 
determined by the court, usually a bond equal to the value of the vessel at the 
voyage’s end plus pending freight.75 Courts have also generally approved of a letter 
of undertaking from the vessel’s insurer as a sufficient method of posting security.76  
It is important to note even if security has been posted, a claimant’s ability to 
challenge the sufficiency of the amount posted is not threatened. A claimant may 
bring a motion to increase the security or have an appraisal of the vessel and her 
pending freight, if the original posting of security is insufficient.77 For example, in 
Trico Marine Assets, Inc. v. Diamond Servs. Corp., the court granted claimants 
motion to increase security because the letter of undertaking inaccurately estimated 
the pre-collision value of the vessel and overestimated the depreciation.78 The 
marine surveyor calculated the value of the vessel to be $4,000,000US million 
dollars and subtracted an estimated $500,000US dollars in depreciation.79 Diamond, 
the previous owner of the vessel conceded the value to be $4,500,000US million 
dollars and that the actual cost of repairs equaled $251,870.09US dollars.80 The 
court upon the motion of claimant, determined that Diamond and its surveyor 
inaccurately calculated the value of the vessel and ordered an increase of 
$748,129.91US dollars in security to represent the true value of the vessel and/or 
limitation fund.81  
The admiralty court retains great discretion in determining what constitutes 
appropriate security and may either order an independent appraisal or order an 
increase or reduction in the security.82 
C. Injunctions or Stays of other Proceedings against the Vessel Owner 
Once a vessel owner has filed for limitation of liability in the district court and 
deposited the appropriate security, the court will issue a stay of all proceedings in 
                                                
75  46 U.S.C. § 30511(b)(1); See also Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule F – permitting some courts 
to allow an amount to be deposited into the registry of the court in lieu of a bond for 
cost. 
76  Complaint of Dammers & Vanderheide, 836 F.2d 750 (2nd Cir. 1988). 
77  Luhr Brothers Inc. v. Gagnard, 765 F.Supp. 1264, 1269 (W.D. La 1991). 
78  Trico Marine Assets, Inc. v. Diamond Servs. Corp., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2710 at 
7-8 (E.D. La 2001). 
79  Id. at 4. 
80  Id. at 7. 
81  Id. at 9. 
82  In Re Complaint of Clearsky Shipping Corp., 1997 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 12355 at 4 
(E.D. La 1997); Admiralty Rule F(7). 
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other courts for actions arising out of the casualty in question.83 Under Rule F(3) of 
the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, all claims and 
proceedings against a vessel owner or the vessel owner’s property cease and an 
injunction may be issued by the district court in which the limitation proceeding has 
been filed, enjoining further prosecution of any action or proceeding against the 
vessel owner with respect to any claim subject to the limitation action.84 
While the stay is in effect, the federal district court will issue a notice to all 
persons with potential claims arising from the casualty to file their respective claims 
in the limitation proceeding.85 The deadline for filing of claims shall not be less than 
thirty days after issuance of the notice; however, the district court may extend the 
time period for which a claim may be filed if good cause exists.86 The district court 
will also require the vessel owner to publish notice of its limitation proceeding 
usually in the local newspaper87 and the vessel owner must mail notices to all 
persons presumed or known to have a claim.88  
The purpose of the injunction and Rule F is so all claims can be filed within 
a single proceeding and a concursus can be established to protect the interests of the 
shipowner and all claimants within the limitation proceeding. Once all claims have 
been filed, the district court will determine whether the claims presented will exceed 
the value of the limitation fund.89 If the court determines that the amount of claims 
do not exceed the limitation fund, the court has discretion to lift the stay and allow 
the claimants to litigate in his or her chosen forum.90  
Two circumstances exist where a claimant can proceed outside the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the federal admiralty court and request the district court to lift the stay 
or injunction as long as the rights of the vessel owner are protected. 
                                                
83  46 U.S.C. § 30511(c). 
84  Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule F(3). 
85  Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule F(4). 
86  Id.; Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Blue Stack Towing Co., 313 F.2d 359, 362-63 (5th 
Cir. 1963) – Court may allow late-filed claims for good reasons and ‘so long as the 
limitation proceeding is pending and undetermined, and the rights of the parties are 
not adversely affected.’ See also Golnoy Barge Co. v. M/T Shinoussa, 980 F.2d 349 
(5th Cir. 1993). 
87  For example, in the Eastern District of Louisiana, the court requires the vessel 
owner to publish notice in the legal section of the New Orleans Times-Picayune; 
See E.D.LA. Local Adm. R. 64.5.  
88  Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule F(4). 
89  Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule F(7). 
90  In Re Port Arthur Towing Co., 42 F.3d 312, 316 (5th Cir. 1995). 
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1. Can a Claimant pursue his Claim against a Vessel Owner 
outside the Limitation Proceeding? 
 
As stated in section C, supra, there are two exceptions that permit a claimant to 
proceed outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal admiralty court and request 
the district court to lift the stay or injunction. These exceptions initially arose out of 
the long-standing conflict facing claimants and shipowners. On the one hand, 
shipowners are entitled to certain protections and rights set forth in 46 U.S.C. § 
30501 et seq., which govern the shipowner’s right to limitation of liability and also 
grants exclusive jurisdiction to the district courts sitting in admiralty. On the other 
hand, claimants have a right to pursue their common law remedies in state court or 
federal court on the ‘law’ side under the Savings-to-Suitors Clause of 28 U.S.C. § 
1333. 
In an attempt to resolve this long-standing conflict, the United States 
Supreme Court created two circumstances under which claimants in a limitation 
proceeding may proceed outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal admiralty 
court91 provided the appropriate stipulations are given: the single claimant-
inadequate fund cases;92 and the multiple claimant-adequate fund cases.93 
a. The Single Claimant-inadequate Fund Exception 
 
The United States Supreme Court in Langes v. Green first noted that the major 
purpose of the limitation proceeding is to create a concursus to resolve competing 
claims to the limitation fund.94 The Court stated that when only one claimant is 
involved, there are no competing interests to the limitation fund; therefore, there is 
                                                
91  The Supreme Court held in Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., Lake Tankers 
Corp. v. Henn and Langes v. Green held that an injunction should be lifted when the 
shipowner’s right to federal admiralty control over the limitation issue can be 
protected while at the same time honoring the forum-selection rights of those 
claiming against the ship – citing: Robertson and Sturley, Recent Developments in 
Admiralty and Maritime Law at the National Level and in the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits, 31 Tul. Mar.L.J. 463, 550 (Summer 2007).  
92  Donaldson, Effect of other Proceedings of Shipowner’s Petition in Admiralty for 
Limitation of Liability under 46 U.S.C. § 183 et seq., 47 A.L.R. Fed. 490 (1980) at 
§ 3 – 5. 
93  Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147, 152 (1957); Texaco v. Williams, 47 
F.3d 765, 767 (5th Cir. 1995); In the Matter Tidewater, Inc., 938 F. Supp. 375, 377 
(E.D. La 1996). See also, Donaldson, Effect of other Proceedings of Shipowner’s 
Petition in Admiralty for Limitation of Liability under 46 U.S.C. § 183 et seq., 47 
A.L.R. Fed. 490 (1980) at § 6 – 10. 
94  Landrieu, Stipulations: Sidestepping the Limitation of Shipowner’ Liability Act, 23 
Tul. Mar. Law. 429 (1999) at note 17. 
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no need for a concursus.95 As a result, a single claimant should be allowed to try 
liability and damage issues in his chosen forum.96 However, the claimant must first 
file certain stipulations that protect the shipowner’s rights97 to adjudicate its claim 
for limitation of liability in an admiralty court.98 If the claimant provides the court 
with the necessary stipulations, the district court must lift the stay.99 
b. The Multiple Claimant-adequate Fund Exception 
 
In 1957, the U.S. Supreme Court in Lake Tankers v. Henn100 was faced with another 
conflict involving the rights of claimants whose claims did not exceed the amount of 
the limitation fund. The case arose out of a collision between a tug and barge with a 
pleasure yacht.101 The injured persons originally filed suit in state court for damages 
exceeding the value of the tug and barge.102 Thereafter, the injured claimants filed 
stipulations protecting the shipowner’s rights and reduced the amount of their 
respective claims to an amount less than the value of the vessel and her pending 
freight.103  
Weighing in on the situation, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
shipowner’s right of limitation under the Limitation Act was fully protected and the 
United States Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit was correct in lifting the stay 
and allowing the respondents to proceed in state court pursuant to their common law 
remedy.104 The Supreme Court stated: 
‘For us to expand the jurisdictional provisions of the Act to prevent 
respondent from now proceeding in her state case would transform 
the Act from a protective instrument to an offensive weapon by 
which the shipowner could deprive suitors of their common-law 
rights, even where the limitation fund is known to be more than 
adequate to satisfy all demands upon it. The shipowner's right to limit 
liability is not so boundless. The Act is not one of immunity from 
liability but of limitation of it and we read no other privilege for the 
                                                
95  Langes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 540 (1931). 
96  Id. 
97  Bono, Protective Stipulations and the Single Claimant Exception in the Limitation 
of Liability Proceedings, 17 Mar. Law. 257, 260-64 (Spring 1992). 
98  Langes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 540 (1931). 
99  Id. at 540-44; Ex Parte Green, 286 U.S. 437, 438-40 (1932); Helena Marine Serv., 
Inc. v. Sioux City, 564 F.2d 15, 18 (8th Cir. 1977).  
100  Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147, 148 (1957). 
101  Id. 
102  Id. 
103  Id. 
104  Landrieu, Stipulations: Sidestepping the Limitation of Shipowner’ Liability Act, 23 
Tul. Mar. Law. 429 (1999) at note 33. 
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shipowner into its language over and above that granting him limited 
liability. In fact, the Congress not only created the limitation 
procedure for the primary purpose of apportioning the limitation fund 
among the claimants where that fund was inadequate to pay the 
claims in full, but it reserved to such suitors their common-law 
remedies.’105 
 
Thus the Court recognized that when a shipowner is not exposed to liability 
in excess of the limitation fund, there is no need for a concursus even if multiple 
claimants are involved. This factual scenario became known as the multiple 
claimant-adequate fund exception. 
c. What is needed for a Claimant to execute the 
‘Appropriate’ Stipulation protecting the Shipowner 
and allowing him to litigate in his chosen forum? 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Lake Tankers and Langes provided two means for a 
district court sitting in admiralty to lift an injunction and allow the claimant to 
litigate in federal ‘law’ court or state court; however, these exceptions were 
contingent on the claimant filing the necessary stipulations protecting the vessel 
owner’s rights to limit liability. 
An example of the ‘recurrent and inherent conflict’ between the exclusive 
jurisdiction that the Limitation Act vests in admiralty courts and the common law 
remedies embodied in the Saving-to-Suitors Clause106 was the issue in Luhr Bros. v. 
Gagnard.107 The court had to reconcile ‘the rights of a shipowner to have all 
litigation concerning a maritime mishap occur in one admiralty proceeding (and thus 
without a jury) with the Jones Act which affords to injured crewmen the right to 
obtain a jury trial in a forum of the crewman's choosing.’108 The court granted the 
claimant’s motion to lift the injunction contingent on filing certain protective 
stipulations protecting the vessel owner’s rights under the limitation proceeding.109 
Those stipulations included: (1) the vessel owner’s right to litigate all issues relating 
to his right to limit liability in federal court, (2) that the claimant will not seek a 
judgment in the state forum on the vessel owner’s right to limit his liability and will 
                                                
105  Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U.S. at 152. 
106  28 U.S.C. § 1333. 
107  Luhr Bros., Inc. v. Gagnard, 765 F. Supp. 1264 (W.D. La 1991).  
108  Id. at 1267. 
109  Id. at 1270. 
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waive any right to a claim of res judicata110 based on the state court judgment, and 
(3) that the claimant has to stipulate to the value of the fund.111 With regard to the 
third stipulation, the court further stated, ‘a claimant need not proclaim that the 
petitioner’s stipulation for value is sufficient; he need only stipulate that the 
admiralty court will determine the question of sufficiency.’112 
Furthermore, various courts have added to the requirements of a protective 
stipulation. For example, in Beiswenger Enterprises Corporation (“BEC”) v. 
Carletta, the court examined the contents of a protective stipulation and added that a 
stipulation must protect the vessel owner from litigation by the claimants in any 
forum outside the limitation proceeding, not only in a state court.113 Therefore, a 
claimant must not only waive res judicata for state court judgments but also any 
judgments in federal court. 
Thus, a claimant by filing the necessary stipulations114 can effectively protect 
the vessel owner’s rights in the limitation proceeding and lift the injunction allowing 
him to pursue his claim or common law remedy in his chosen forum under the 
Savings-to-Suitors Clause in 28 U.S.C. § 1333. 
d. The Exception within the Exception: The Multiple 
Claimant-inadequate Fund Scenario 
 
More recently, jurisprudence has developed to handle cases involving multiple 
claimants and an inadequate fund. The Supreme Court has never directly addressed 
the issue; however, the circuit courts have acknowledged that claimants can 
‘transform a multiple-claims-inadequate-fund into the functional equivalent of a 
single claim case through executing the appropriate stipulations.’115 The court in 
                                                
110  Gilmore & Black, The Law of Admiralty, § 10-19, at 872-74 (discussing 
importance of res judicata stipulation). 
111  Tadross, The Savings to Suitors Clause vs. The Limitation of Liability Act: A 
Compromise as Found in Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 26 Tul. Mar. Law. 
695 (Summer, 2002) at note 63. 
112   Luhr Bros., Inc. v. Gagnard, 765 F. Supp. at 1269; See also Two “R” Drilling Co. 
v. Rogers, 943 F.2d 576, 578 (5th Cir. 1991); Dammers & Vanderheide v. Corona, 
836 F.2d 750, 758 (2nd Cir. 1988); Valley Line Co. v. Ryan, 771 F.2d 366, 373 (8th 
Cir. 1985). 
113  Beiswenger Enterprises Corporation (“BEC”) v. Carletta, 86 F.3d 1032, 1044 (11th 
Cir. 1996). 
114  Bono, Protective Stipulations and the Single Claimant Exception in the Limitation 
of Liability Proceedings, 17 Mar. Law. 257, 271 (Spring 1992). 
115  Landrieu, Stipulations: Sidestepping the Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability Act, 
23 Tul. Mar. Law. 429 (1999) at note 56; Beiswenger Enterprises Corporation 
(“BEC”) v. Carletta, 86 F.3d 1032, 1038 (11th Cir. 1996); Texaco v. Williams, 47 
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Magnolia Marine Transport116 explained, ‘multiple claimants may reduce their 
claims to the equivalent of a single claim by agreeing and stipulating as to the 
priority in which the claimants will receive satisfaction against the shipowner from 
the limited fund.’117 By executing such a stipulation, the claimants protect the rights 
of the vessel owner and eliminate the possibility of competing claims. 
However, the lower circuit courts have been inconsistent in defining what 
truly constitutes multiple claims within the meaning of the Limitation Act because 
the U.S. Supreme Court has not directly addressed the multiple claimant-inadequate 
fund stipulation. The different lines of reasoning encompassing the lower courts 
have resulted in a spilt between the U.S. Circuit Courts. 
i. The Split in the U.S. Circuit Courts regarding 
Third Party Indemnity and Contribution 
Claims 
 
The Sixth and Eight Circuits118 have held that a party seeking contribution and 
indemnity is not to be considered separate claimants because the claim is merely 
derivative of the plaintiff’s claim and thus does not present a multiple claimant 
situation for the purposes of Limitation of Liability.119  
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit Court has held in several cases that a party 
seeking contribution and indemnity is considered a claimant for limitation purposes 
and must sign the appropriate stipulation to ensure the shipowner's rights are 
adequately protected.120  
The Second, Third and Eleventh Circuits have also held that the threat posed 
by an indemnity and contribution claim against a shipowner creates a multiple claim 
situation necessitating a concursus.121 
                                                                                                                                    
F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1995); Dammers & Vanderheide v. Corona, 836 F.2d 750, 
756 (2nd Cir. 1988);  S & E Shipping Corp. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 678 F.2d 
636, 644 (6th Cir. 1982); Universal Towing Co. v. Barrale, 595 F.2d 414, 419 (8th 
Cir. 1979).  
116  Magnolia Marine Transport Co. v. Laplace Towing Corp., 964 F.2d 1571 (5th Cir. 
1992).  
117  Id. at 1576. 
118  S & E Shipping Corp. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 678 F.2d at 645; Universal 
Towing Co. v. Barrale, 595 F.2d at 419. 
119  46 U.S.C. § 30511 et seq.    
120  In the Complaint of Port Arthur Towing Co., 42 F.3d 312, 316 (5th Cir. 1995); 
Odeco Oil & Gas Co. v. Bonnette, 74 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 1996). 
121  Gorman v. Cerasia, 2 F.3d 519, 526-27 (3rd Cir. 1993); Dammers & Vanderheide v. 
Corona, 836 F.2d 750, 757 (2nd Cir. 1988); Beiswenger Enters. Corp. v. Carletta, 
86 F.3d 1032, 1042 (11th Cir. 1996). 
  17 
ii. A Need for Uniformity Among the U.S. 
Circuit Courts 
 
There is a multiplicity of cases ranging from Circuit to Circuit interpreting the 
different scenarios for the multiple claimant-inadequate fund stipulation. The 
reasoning is that a claimant should not be prevented from litigating his or her suit 
under the common law remedies when all parties make the appropriate stipulations 
affording the shipowner his protections under the Limitation Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30501 
et. seq. 
The issue of whether a claim for contribution and indemnity is to be 
considered a separate claim for the purposes of creating a multiple claimant situation 
has been met with different lines of reasoning on what a possible claimant can or 
cannot recover from a shipowner in the limitation proceeding.  
In S & E Shipping Corp., the court reasoned that the indemnity claim is 
derived from and dependent on the primary claim against the shipowner.122 In 
essence if the injured claimants proceed against the shipowner, the recovery is 
limited to the value of the limitation fund.123 Likewise, if the injured claimant 
proceeds against the third party, the indemnity claim is also limited to the value of 
the limitation fund.124 Because the third party seeking indemnity can only recover 
what the claimant is entitled to recover which cannot exceed the value of the 
limitation fund, the third party in essence assumes the position of the injured 
claimant.125 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit concluded that indemnity and contribution 
claims based on negligence theories do not create a multiple claims fund situation.126 
On the other hand, the Third Circuit in Gorman v. Cerasia reasoned that a 
multiple claimant situation could arise if the claimant’s seek to enforce a state court 
judgment against the shipowner up to the value of the limitation fund and then 
proceed to recover the remaining amount of the judgment against the shipowner’s 
codefendants.127 If the defendants do not sign the protective stipulations with the 
admiralty court, they would not be foreclosed from recovering against the shipowner 
                                                
122  S & E Shipping Corp. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 678 F.2d at 644. 
123  Id. at 645. 
124  Id. 
125  Id. 
126  Id. 
127  Gorman v. Cerasia, 2 F.3d at 527. 
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for contribution, even though his or her liability (assuming no privity or knowledge 
exists) has already been exhausted.128 
Other cases regarding third party claims refer to Justice Cornelia G. 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in S & E Shipping which presents a similar 
scenario.129 Likewise, a similar analogy of the facts presented in Gorman was before 
the court in Kattelman, where an unsatisfied judgment could potentially be enforced 
against a shipowner by way of a third party cross claim and/or indemnification after 
exhausting the limitation fund.130 
Due to the diverse opinions in the U.S. Circuit Courts, a claimant in a 
limitation proceeding may or may not be able to file the appropriate stipulations 
because of the different interpretations of contribution and indemnity claims. On one 
hand, a claimant within the Sixth and Eight Circuit’s jurisdiction may not be 
required to stipulate to the third party contribution and indemnity claim because the 
claim is considered derivative. On the other hand, claimants in the Second, Third, 
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits would be required to stipulate to the priority of claims 
because contribution and indemnity are considered separate claims. This creates a 
potential problem when not all claimants are willing to prioritize their claims behind 
other claimants. One would assume because of the long standing dilemma between 
the rights vested in the Limitation Act and those granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1333, a 
U. S. Supreme Court ruling on multiple claims would resolve the split and put all 
claimants on ‘equal footing’131 when defining and assessing their respective claims 
within the limitation proceeding. 
iii. More Problems for Claimants when attempting 
to execute a Multiple Claimant-inadequate 
Fund Stipulation 
 
                                                
128  Gorman v. Cerasia, 2 F.3d at 527. 
129  S & E Shipping Corp. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 678 F.2d at 646-48; Judge 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion is distinguishable by the holding in Beiswenger 
Enters. Corp. v. Carletta, 86 F.3d 1032, 1042-43 (11th Cir. 1996). 
130  Kattelman v. Otis Engineering Corp., 696 F.Supp 1111, 1115 (E.D. La 1988). 
131  For example, all Circuit Courts have recognized that a multiple claimant situation 
exists where a third party seeking indemnity or contribution also requests attorneys' 
fees and costs associated with its claim; Dammers & Vanderheide v. Corona, 836 
F.2d at 756. It is . . . well settled that the potential for claims for attorneys' fees or 
costs against a shipowner by a claimant or a third party creates a multiple claimant 
situation necessitating a concursus - S & E Shipping Corp. v. Chesapeake & Ohio 
Ry. Co., 678 F.2d at 645-46; See also Universal Towing Corp. v. Barrale, 595 F.2d 
at 419. 
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Even in holding that a third party claim for contribution and indemnity is considered 
a separate claim within the Limitation proceeding, the U.S. Circuit Courts are again 
split on the requirements of executing a multiple claimant stipulation and it’s affects 
on the parties involved. 
aa. Third Party Codefendants and the Vessel 
Owners Rights 
 
In Beiswenger Enters. Corp. v. Carletta, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that third 
party contribution and indemnity claims do present a multiple claims situation 
requiring a concursus.132 However, the court also acknowledged that the shipowner's 
protections would not be in jeopardy if not all codefendants signed the stipulation.133 
The Beiswenger Court held ‘that if the stipulation waived the claimants’ right to 
collect any judgment against BEC’s codefendants, thereby exposing BEC (‘vessel 
owner’) to liability in excess of the limitation fund, until BEC’s right to limitation 
was determined, the stipulation would cure the “multiple claims” problem and 
would be sufficient to protect the shipowner.’134 Thus, all codefendants did not need 
to sign the stipulation.135  
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Odeco v. Bonnette held that parties seeking 
indemnification and contribution from a shipowner must be considered claimants 
within the meaning of the Limitation Act.136 However, the court further stated ‘in 
order to proceed in state court, all claimants must sign the stipulation protecting the 
shipowner’s rights.’137 
In examining the different holdings among the U.S. Circuit Courts, the law 
and requirements regarding how claimants must either stipulate or sign the 
stipulation to adequately protect the shipowners is unsettled. 
bb. Must a Third Party Claimant for 
Contribution and Indemnity sign the 
Stipulation in order to adequately protect 
the Shipowner’s Rights in the Limitation 
Proceeding? 
 
                                                
132  Beiswenger Enters. Corp. v. Carletta, 86 F.3d at 1041. 
133  Id. 
134  Id. at 1043-44. 
135  Id. See also, Dammers & Vanderheide v. Corona, 836 F.2d at 758-59, holding that 
a vessel owner can be protected from excess liability at the hands of third parties 
even if they do not enter into any protective stipulations. 
136  Odeco Oil & Gas Co. v. Bonnette, 74 F.3d at 675. 
137  Id. 
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The inconsistency among the U.S. Circuit Courts as to whether a third party 
claimant seeking contribution and indemnity actually needs to sign the protective 
stipulation should also be addressed with uniformity. As stated above, the Eleventh 
Circuit in Beiswenger opined that when a claimant states in his or her stipulation 
that no judgment is or will be enforced against the shipowner or any other parties 
(referencing codefendants) until the shipowner’s right to limitation has been 
determined, the stipulation would ‘cure’ the multiple claims issue.138 
 Similarly, the court in The Matter of Dianne Self, dealt with the issue of 
whether all claimants must sign the stipulation versus the sufficiency of the 
stipulations.139 In its analysis, the court stated that the third party claimants for 
indemnity and contribution erred by ignoring the inherent authority of the district 
court to scrutinize not only whether all claimants entered into stipulations, but also 
to measure the overall sufficiency of existing stipulations to protect the vessel owner 
from excess liability, regardless of whether all claimants entered into, signed, or 
crafted their own stipulations.140 The stipulation stated that the claimant would not 
seek to enforce ‘any judgment exposing petitioners to liability in excess of the 
ultimately determined limitation fund, whether against petitioners themselves or by 
enforcement against any third parties entitled to indemnity or contribution from 
petitioners.’141 The court reasoned that by giving up such claims until limitation is 
determined, the claimant has eliminated concerns that competing claims will exhaust 
the limitation fund; additionally, the court was convinced that the stipulation fully 
protected the vessel owner’s rights.142 
 Thus, multiple claimants while disputing a possible third party contribution 
and indemnity claim would need to execute a proper stipulation specifically stating 
that:  
                                                
138  Beiswenger Enters. Corp. v. Carletta, 86 F.3d at 1044. 
139  In The Matter of Dianne Self & William Self Praying for Exoneration From or 
Limitation of Liability, 172 F.Supp. 2d 813, 819 (W.D. La 2001). 
140  Id. at 819. 
141  Id. at 820. 
142  Id. See also In Re Two “R” Drilling Co., 943 F.2d 576, 578 (5th cir. 1991) - holding 
that even in multiple claimant situation, a court can lift the stay and allow state 
court suits if the claimants enter a stipulation that the court determines will 
adequately protect the shipowner under the Limitation Act and against third party 
indemnification claims; Kattelman v. Otis Eng Corp., 696 F. Supp. 1111, 1116 
(E.D. La. 1988) - finding sufficient a stipulation that prevented third party cross-
claims for indemnification or contribution from being in excess of the limitation 
fund. 
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‘in the event there is a judgment or recovery in a State or Federal 
court action in excess of $1000,000.00US dollars, whether against 
the vessel owner, or any other liable party or parties who may make a 
cross claim or claims over against the vessel owner, in no event will 
claimants herein seek to enforce any judgment(s) in State or Federal 
court against the vessel owner prior to the complete adjudication of 
the complaint of limitation of liability in the district court.’143  
 
The stipulation addresses the same issue addressed in the Beiswenger Court, raising 
the issue of whether a third party contribution and indemnity claimant actually needs 
to sign the protective stipulation. 
 It would not be necessary for a contribution and indemnity claimant to sign 
the stipulation because by stipulating not to enforce any judgment whether against 
shipowner or any third parties, the shipowner’s rights are fully protected. A third 
party claim for contribution hinges on any judgment against the third party which 
would not be enforced as stated in the stipulation. 
 An opposing view is illustrated by Justice Cornelia G. Kennedy’s concurring 
opinion in S & E Shipping. Judge Kennedy examined the problems with a co-
defendant’s contribution claim and the multiple claimant situation: 
‘The [plaintiffs] could win a large judgment against [the shipowner 
and its co-defendant] jointly in the state court, say $1,000,000US. 
The [co-defendant] could also win a judgment in state court entitling 
it to contribution from [the shipowner] for anything it pays the 
[plaintiffs] in excess of one-half the judgment, or $500,000US. 
Because of the stipulation they have filed with the District Court, the 
[plaintiffs] could collect no more from [the shipowner] than the value 
of the limitation fund as determined by the District Court. If the fund 
contains only $250,000US… then [the co-defendant], jointly and 
severally liable, would be obligated to pay [plaintiffs] the unpaid 
balance of the judgment or $750,000US. Under its right to 
contribution [the co-defendant] would be entitled to recover from [the 
shipowner] any excess over $500,000US that it paid the [plaintiffs], 
or $250,000US. Since the [co-defendant] did not stipulate that any 
state court judgment in its favor would not be res judicata on the 
limitation question, it would then have a $250,000US claim against 
the [shipowner] that was not subject to limitation. The result would 
be that the [shipowner] would have to pay an amount in excess of the 
limitation fund, when under the principles of the Limitation of 
                                                
143  Landrieu, Stipulations: Sidestepping the Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability Act, 
23 Tul. Mar. Law. 429 (1999) at note 129. 
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Liability Act it should only have been liable for the value of the 
vessel (assuming no privity and knowledge exists.)’144 
 
 While Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion illustrates a practical problem 
with contribution and indemnity claims, it is distinguishable because it does not take 
into account the actual wording or adequacy of a protective stipulation which states 
that no such claim(s) against the shipowner or any other liable parties will be 
enforced. The Beiswenger Court recognizing the nature of the protective stipulation 
and it’s wording stated that third party claims against the shipowner are based solely 
on their liability to the claimants.145 The wording of the stipulation effectively 
eliminates the possibility of competing claims (including contribution and indemnity 
claims) that could exhaust the limitation fund before the shipowner’s rights are 
adjudicated in an admiralty court.146 
 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court in Lewis v. Lewis & Clark147 stated: 
“Stipulations, in addition to other restrictions on state court 
proceedings, ensure ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the owner’s 
right of limitation under the Act was fully protected.’ To expand the 
scope of the exclusive jurisdiction to prevent state court actions 
‘would transform the Act from a protective instrument to an 
offensive weapon by which the shipowner could deprive suitors of 
their common-law rights, even where the limitation fund is known to 
be more than adequate to satisfy all demands upon it.”148 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals stating that when the 
District Court satisfies itself that a vessel owner’s right to seek limitation will be 
protected; the decision to dissolve the injunction is well within the court’s 
discretion.149 
cc. Is there any Possible Resolution for the 
near Future? 
 
As indicated in the above scenarios, there are still many inconsistencies concerning 
the multiple claimant-inadequate fund stipulation. Arguments can be asserted on 
both sides in favor or against the definition of third party contribution and indemnity 
                                                
144  Beiswenger Enters. Corp. v. Carletta, 86 F.3d at 1042; Gorman v. Cerasia, 2 F.3d 
at 527; citing S & E Shipping Corp. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 678 F.2d at 
646-648. 
145  Beiswenger Enters. Corp. v. Carletta, 86 F.3d at 1043. 
146  Id. 
147  Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438 (2001). 
148  Id. at 451. 
149  Id. at 455. 
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claims and whether those claimants are required to sign a protective stipulation. One 
opinion is that the U.S. Circuit Courts would be better equipped if the U.S. Supreme 
Court addressed the split of authorities and resolved the conflict. Much of federal 
maritime law is based on uniformity, and as such a claimant involved in a maritime 
dispute should not be thwarted by inconsistent court rulings in the U.S. Circuit 
Courts. 
On the other hand, one could take into consideration the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s inexperience regarding admiralty disputes150 and opine that a U.S. Circuit 
Court such as the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals may be more attune to decide 
admiralty issues due to the volume of maritime cases circulating in the district courts 
and the abundance of maritime scholars. However, the problem would still exist 
because any decision by the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals would not be 
controlling in the other Circuits. 
 Nevertheless, when considering past precedent and the exceptions created by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Langes151 and Lake Tankers152 and the scarcity of 
decisions thereafter, a decision regarding the adequacy of a multiple claimant-
inadequate fund stipulation and defining multiple claims would not likely be 
addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the near future. 
IV. The South African Limitation of Liability Regime – Practice, Procedure and 
Possible Problems 
 
 A. Introduction 
South African law allows a shipowner to limit its liability for damages arising in 
relation to a single incident.153 There are three primary sources for limitation in 
South Africa: global limitation per ton is permitted in terms of § 261 of the 
Merchant Shipping Act, 1951 (hereafter ‘MSA, 1951’); the SDR-related kilogram or 
package limitation under the Hague-Visby Rules as enacted by the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act, 1986; and South Africa’s oil pollution legislation, largely based 
upon Civil Liability Convention limits.154 South Africa is not a party to either the 
1957 International Convention relating to the Limitation of Liability of Owners of 
                                                
150  Taking into consideration the problems and inconsistent rulings by the Supreme 
Court in determining coverage for Longshoreman under the LHWCA. 
151  Langes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931). 
152  Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147 (1957). 
153  Hare, Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, Chp. 2, p. 56 (1999). 
154  Id. 
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Seagoing Ships or the 1976 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime 
Claims.155  
However, Chapter Five (‘Safety of Ships and Life at Sea’) of the Merchant 
Shipping Act, 1951 includes provisions closely modeled on the 1957 Limitation 
Convention and Section 503 of the English Merchant Shipping Act, 1894.156 The 
relevant sections contained in § 259 – 263 of the MSA, 1951 discuss the rights and 
obligations of parties with respect to collisions, accidents at sea and limitation of 
liability. More importantly, § 261 of the MSA, 1951 provides: 
‘the owner of ship, whether registered in the Republic or not, shall 
not be liable for whole damage, if any loss of life or personal injury 
to any person or any loss of or damage to any property or rights of 
any kind, whether movable or immovable, is caused without his 
actual fault or privity.’157 
 
Thus, a party wishing to limit his liability must prove the loss or damage was caused 
‘without his actual fault or privity.’  
In Atlantic Harvesters of Namibia, Ltd. v. Unterweser Reederei GMBH of 
Bremen [The St. Padarn Case],158 the Cape Court relied heavily on English cases 
dealing with § 503 of the English Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 and ‘held that the 
burden of proving absence of fault or privity rested on the person seeking to limit his 
liability.’159 The English concept of ‘fault or privity’ remains embodied in the South 
African Merchant Shipping Act of 1951, the 1957 Limitation Convention and the 
United States Limitation Act; however, England and other sea-trading nations have 
long since departed from such arbitrary concepts through the enactment of the 1976 
Limitation Convention. Presently, the South African MSA, 1951 regulates the 
limitation of liability regime and the Cape Court in the Nagos160 accepted that 
limitation is ‘a maritime claim in its own right.’161 A shipowner must look to the 
provisions of the MSA, 1951 to assess what protections are afforded to those parties 
involved in maritime ventures. 
                                                
155  Dyason, South African Maritime Law – An Overview of Some Developments, 32 J. 
Mar. L. & Comm. 475, 491 (July 2001). 
156  Id. 
157  Merchant Shipping Act, Act 57 of 1951, § 261(1). 
158  Atlantic Harvesters of Namibia, Ltd. v. Unterweser Reederei GMBH of Bremen 
[The St. Padarn Case, 1986 (4) SA (865) (C). 
159  Dyason, South African Maritime Law – An Overview of Some Developments, 32 J. 
Mar. L. & Comm. 475, 493 (July 2001). 
160  The Nagos, 1996 (2) SA 261 (D). 
161  Hare, Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, Chp. 2, p.56 (1999). 
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B. Persons Entitled to Limit Liability under the Merchant Shipping Act 
of 1951 
 
The right to limit extends to a much broader class of persons when compared to the 
United States limitation statute. The operative provisions addressing the class of 
persons entitled to limit are found in § 261 and § 263 of the MSA, 1951. Section 261 
provides for the ‘owner of a ship, whether registered in the Republic or not…’162 
and § 261(3) further provides ‘that the provisions of this section shall extend and 
apply to owners, builders, or other persons interested in any ship built at any port or 
place in the Republic, from and including the launching of such ship until 
registration…’163 The effect of the above provisions not only extends the right to 
limit to the owner of a ship ‘whether registered or unregistered in the Republic,’ but 
also to owners, builders and/or other interested persons of ‘any’ ship. A ‘ship’ is 
defined in § 2 of the MSA, 1951 and includes ‘any vessel used for transportation or 
any other purpose on or under the surface of the water.’164  
Section 263 encompasses the rights of persons other than the owner and § 
263(2) defines ‘owner’ as ‘any charterer, any person interested in or in possession of 
the ship and a manager or operator of such ship.’165 The MSA, 1951 definition of 
‘charterer’ includes a demise charterer, time charterer and even a voyage charterer166 
whereby U.S. law (46 U.S.C. § 30501) only provides limitation to a shipowner 
and/or demise/bareboat charterer.167 In addition, the proviso in § 261(3) specifically 
includes ships under construction but only from the period of launching to 
registration.168 It is important to note that the ship must be under construction at a 
port or any place located in South Africa.169 With regard to the period prior to 
launching, the protections of § 261 would not attach because the vessel is still under 
construction and arguably not capable of being ‘used for transportation.’170  
                                                
162  Merchant Shipping Act, Act 57 of 1951, § 261(1). 
163  Merchant Shipping Act, Act 57 of 1951, § 261(2). 
164  Merchant Shipping Act, Act 57 of 1951, § 2. 
165  Merchant Shipping Act, Act 57 of 1951, § 263(2). 
166  Hare, Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, Chp. 11, p. 385 
(1999). 
167  46 U.S.C. § 30501. 
168  Hare, Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, Chp. 11, p. 385 
(1999). 
169  Id. 
170  Id. at 386. 
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 Furthermore, Section 261(3) requires that all claims for damage in respect of 
loss of life, personal injury and loss of or damage to property or rights ‘arise from 
‘any single occasion.’171 The single occasion rule takes into account that separate 
casualties may occur on the same voyage and such reasoning is in accord with the 
limitation provisions contained in the 1957 and 1976 Limitation Conventions. It is 
apparent from a reading of the limitation provisions that the MSA, 1951 
encompasses a much broader class of persons seeking to limit liability than the 
United States Limitation Act but both acts are equally ineffective when defining a 
standard of conduct for which shipowners actions can be judged. 
 
V. The South African Procedure for Filing for Limitation of Liability under the 
Admiralty Proceedings Rule 
 
A. Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act of 1983 (as amended with 
effect from July 1, 1992) 
 
The South African Admiralty jurisdiction came of age with the passing of the 
Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act of 1983 (hereinafter ‘AJRA, 1983’).172 This 
Act had the stated purpose: 
‘To provide for the vesting of the powers of the admiralty courts of 
the Republic in the provincial and local divisions of the Supreme 
[High] Court of South Africa, and for the extension of those powers: 
for the law to be applied by, and for the procedure applicable in, 
those divisions…’173 
 
The AJRA, 1983 sought to extend the jurisdiction of the High Court in Admiralty to 
all maritime disputes and § 2 of the AJRA, 1983 sets forth the jurisdictional 
parameters.174 Section 2 states:  
‘Subject to the provisions of this Act each provincial and local 
division, including a circuit local division, of the High Court of South 
Africa shall have jurisdiction (admiralty jurisdiction) to hear and 
determine any maritime claim (including, in the case of salvage, 
claims in respect of ships, cargo or goods found on land), irrespective 
of the place where it arose, of the place of registration of the ship 
concerned or of the residence, domicile or nationality of its 
owner.’175 
 
                                                
171  Merchant Shipping Act, Act 57 of 1951, § 261(3). 
172  Hare, Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, Chp. 1, p. 16 (1999). 
173  Id.  
174 Id. 
175  Id. at 17. 
  27 
This broad jurisdiction reflects the unlimited jurisdiction of the High Court and the 
constitutional right of everyone in South Africa, incola or peregrinus to have 
recourse to a court.176 One caveat for the extension of jurisdiction is that the matter 
must be a ‘maritime claim’ as defined in Section 1(1).177 Once the jurisdictional 
element is met, the court must then also determine the law applicable in light of § 6 
of the AJRA, 1983. Section 6 provides the transition for admiralty matters 
previously decided under the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, of the United 
Kingdom to the current AJRA, 1983 and sets forth the following order of 
application: South African statutory law will prevail; choice of law terms will be 
upheld; in the absence of an applicable statute and where a matter invokes old 
jurisdiction that predated November 1983, English Law as it was in November 1983 
will be directly applicable; and where jurisdiction is new, created by the AJRA, 
1983, the present-day South African Roman-Dutch common law applies.178  
Limitation of liability and its procedure is a statutory matter governed by the 
law of the forum; therefore, the rights available under § 261 are unaffected by the 
provisions of § 6 of the AJRA, 1983.179 Thus, once a claimant asserts any claims for 
damage and a shipowner seeks limitation, the claims will fall under the auspices of § 
261 et seq of the MSA, 1951.180 Section 261 will over-ride any choice of law 
provision in a contract because limitation is a matter of procedural and not of 
substantive law, regardless of what law created the liability, in delict or in 
contract.181 
The requirement of a maritime claim is key to South African Admiralty 
jurisdiction and practice.182 Without a maritime claim as defined by the AJRA, 
1983, a litigant has no recourse in admiralty nor does the High Court in admiralty 
have jurisdiction.183 A litigant would have to utilize the common law jurisdiction of 
the High Court or the Magistrate Court where appropriate.184 The maritime claim is 
thus regarded as the keel block of the South African admiralty statutory right in 
                                                
176  Hare, Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, Chp. 1, p. 17 (1999). 
177  Id. 
178  Id. at 18-19. 
179  Id. at 387 and 396. 
180  Id. at 396. 
181  Id. at 396. 
182  Id. at 44. 
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rem185 and the definitions can be found in § 1 of the AJRA, 1983. While the list for 
possible ‘maritime claims’ is set out in § 1, only § 1(w), (x), (dd), and (ee) will be 
examined for the purposes of this article.186 Section 1(w) defines a maritime claim 
as arising out of or relating to ‘the limitation of liability of the owner of a ship or of 
any person entitled to any similar limitation of liability.’187 Section (1)(x) also refers 
to ‘the distribution of a fund or any portion of a fund held or to be held by, or in 
accordance with the directions of, any court in the exercise of its admiralty 
jurisdiction, or any officer of any court exercising such jurisdiction.’188 The list of 
maritime claims creates a numerous clauses; however, any claimant can usually 
assert a maritime claim based on the catchall provisions of § (1)(dd) and (ee).189 A 
claimant in a limitation proceeding must aver each specific maritime claim as it 
relates and the significance of classifying the correct maritime claim becomes 
apparent when the claimant seeks to rank its claim against other claimants sharing in 
the distribution of the fund.190  
The AJRA, 1983 also sets forth specific parameters in § 3 governing the 
form of proceedings; Section 4 and 5 for procedure, rules and powers of court; and 
Section 10 and 11 regarding claims against the fund and ranking of such claims.191 
However, the AJRA, 1983 works in conjunction with the Admiralty Proceedings 
Rules which contain certain provisions for a court to make directions relating to 
procedures where limitation is claimed.192 
B. Admiralty Proceedings Rules 
 
The Admiralty Proceedings Rules regulate the conduct of the admiralty proceedings 
of the several provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court of South 
                                                
185  Hare, Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, Chp. 2, p. 44 (1999). 
186  Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act of 1983; The scope of this paper is limited to 
the rights of persons seeking to limit liability within the provisions of § 261 et seq. 
187  Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act of 1983, § 1(1)(w). 
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Africa.193 The applicable provision is contained in § 23 titled ‘Representative 
actions and limitation of liability’ stating: 
‘where any person claims to be entitled to a limitation of liability 
referred to in paragraph (w) of the definition of “maritime claim” in § 
1(1) of the AJRA, the court may give such directions as it deems fit 
with regard to the procedure in any such claim, the staying of any 
other proceedings and the conditions for the consideration of any 
such claim, which may include a condition that such amount as the 
court may order be paid to abide the result of the consideration of the 
said claim, or that the claimant be required to admit liability for all or 
any claims made against him or her, or any other condition which the 
court deems fit.’194 
 
Under South African law, there is no provision for the issuing of a Writ of 
Limitation.195 A shipowner, charterer and/or other interested persons in terms of § 
261 and § 263 may plead limitation by way of a defense to a claim, either alone or in 
the alternative to a general or specific demand as to primary liability on the 
merits.196 The procedure for establishing a limitation fund is to apply to court on 
affidavit for an order permitting owners to limit their liability in South Africa in 
terms of the MSA, 1951 and the AJRA, 1983 and to establish a fund with the 
Registar.197 It is important to note that it is not necessary to establish a limitation 
fund or to commence a limitation action for § 261 et seq. to apply.198 The fund can 
consist of a bank guarantee, bond or P&I club letter of undertaking. 
 Claims for damage or personal injury caused by a ship or sustained by any 
person aboard a ship in terms of the MSA, 1951 are subject to a two-year 
prescription period.199 The prescription period may vary depending on whether such 
claims are brought in personam or in rem and the court has the discretion to extend 
the two-year period if certain fact requirements are met.200 Furthermore, the 
establishment of security will also interrupt the running of prescription, even if the 
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proceedings have not at that time been issued, provided that further steps to enforce 
the claim are taken with a one-year period from the posting of such security.201 
C. Breaking Limitation and the Notion of Actual Fault and/or Privity 
 
The notion of actual fault and/or privity is embodied in the United States limitation 
statute, South African Merchant Shipping Act of 1951, and the 1957 Limitation 
Convention. Section 261(1) provides that the owner of a ship is not liable for the 
whole damage when such damage or loss is caused ‘without his actual fault or 
privity.’202 Over the years, the definition of actual fault and/or privity has been met 
with much criticism because of the difficulty in defining what actions constitute 
actual fault and/or privity. Legal scholars have viewed the phrases ‘actual fault or 
privity’ and ‘privity or knowledge’ as a relatively poor standard for determining 
whether a shipowner is allowed to limit his liability. One legal scholar203 has been 
noted as saying ‘notions of privity or knowledge are empty containers into which the 
courts are free to pour whatever content they will.’204  
The recent passage of the International Safety Management Code (hereafter 
‘ISM Code’) has also revolutionized the factual enquiry regarding the shipowners 
actions in relation to what actions constitute actual fault or privity.205 The ISM Code 
requires a shipowner to appoint a ‘designated person’ who is given the responsibility 
to monitor safety and pollution prevention206 and is now perhaps the most important 
industry standard against which the actions of a shipowner may be adjudged as 
prudent.207  
Privity or knowledge in the United States can be best understood as the 
following: 
‘Privity or knowledge does not necessarily require a showing of 
actual knowledge. It is deemed to exist if the shipowner has the 
means of obtaining knowledge, or if he would have obtained the 
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knowledge by reasonable inspection. Knowledge is not only what the 
shipowner knows, but what he is charged with discovering.’208 
 
The modern reality of shipping has created even more problems in ascribing actual 
fault or privity because ships are owned by complex corporate structures that are far 
removed from the day-to-day operations of the ships.209 Furthermore, the burden of 
proof incorporated into § 261 of the MSA, 1951 also requires the shipowner to 
discharge the onus of proof that the damage was caused without his ‘actual fault or 
privity.’210 This burden of proof can be viewed as tenuous and South Africa has 
become a favorable jurisdiction for claimants because the ability to break limitation 
is easier when compared to other limitation regimes.211 The 1976 Limitation 
Convention shifts the burden to the claimant who must prove that the intent, 
recklessness and knowledge of the defendant shipowner or charterer caused the loss 
and this standard of conduct is more in accord with the ISM Code.212  
Nevertheless, the South African courts in The Tigr213 and The BOS 400 have 
held that there is ‘nothing opprobrious’ in seeking the most advantageous limitation 
regime as a legitimate juridical advantage where competing regimes have 
jurisdiction to hear the claim.214 The commercial principles on which limitation was 
originally founded have been lost in the skewed judicial interpretations of defining 
what actions constitute  ‘actual fault or privity’ and many countries have now 
adopted the 1976 Limitation Convention’s standard which has resulted in greater 
certainty and simplicity for both shipowners, claimants and insurers.    
 
D. A New Solution for South Africa? 
 
The Maritime Las Association of South Africa (hereafter ‘MLASA’) was 
established in February 1974 as a result of concern among maritime lawyers and the 
shipping industry that legislation in South Africa regulating maritime affairs did not 
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appear to be keeping pace with developments elsewhere in the world.215 One of the 
objectives of the MLASA was to co-operate, promote, and consider with the 
Comite’ Maritime Internationale (hereafter ‘CMI’) and any other associations’ 
proposals for the unification of maritime, aviation, rail and road transport laws and 
practice of different nations.216 The MLASA recently asked the government to 
amend the Merchant Shipping Act of 1951 as well as to replace the ‘actual fault or 
privity’ requirement with that of ‘recklessness and intent’ as provided by the 1976 
Limitation Convention and also to shift the burden of proof from the 
carrier/shipowner to the claimant.217 The net result is that South Africa, as an interim 
measure, would adopt the limits of the 1976 Limitation regime, but would also 
hopefully exclude some of the Convention’s flaws.218  
The MLASA has also expressed a strong desire to work with the CMI in 
seeking a review of the 1976 Limitation Convention.219 The majority of South 
Africa’s major trading partners have adopted the 1976 Limitation Convention and 
the South Africa Maritime Law Association has presented the topic on numerous 
occasions to the South African legislature and recently at a CMI Colloquium 
convened in Cape Town in February 2006.220 The answer as to whether South 
Africa will move forward and adopt the 1976 Limitation Convention remains to be 
seen. 
 
VI. Determining the value of the Limitation Fund 
 
 A.  United States Law 
 
Under the Limitation Act, the limitation fund is equal to the value of the vessel and 
her then pending freight.221 The value is determined at the conclusion of the voyage, 
after the collision or casualty.222 In cases where the vessel has sunk, the value of the 
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vessel will be its salvage value.223 If the vessel cannot be salvaged, the ship’s value 
may be zero.224 Several questions may arise inquiring what the actual value of the 
vessel consists of when determining the limitation fund. 
1. What does ‘Pending Freight’ Constitute? 
The term ‘pending freight’ for purposes of constituting the limitation fund means the 
total earnings of the vessel for the voyage.225 The U.S. Supreme Court in The Main 
v. Williams stated that the real object of the limitation statute is ‘to limit the liability 
of vessel owners to their interest in the adventure,’ which necessarily includes the 
value of the vessel and her freight.226 The U.S. Supreme Court defined ‘freight’ 
broadly, stating that it refers to ‘all reward, hire, or compensation, paid for the use of 
ships.’227 The U.S. Supreme Court also stated that the ‘pending freight’ doctrine 
should be broadly construed in favor of the injured party.228 
For example, the court in The Complaint of North Am. Trailing Co., held that 
the value of a dredging contract in which the vessel was engaged should be included 
in the liability fund as ‘pending freight.’229 
Similarly, in In the Matter of Falcon Inland Inc., the court held that the value 
of a drilling contract between the vessel owner and a third party was properly 
included as ‘pending freight’ for the purposes of limitation.230 The vessel owner 
received $1,509,387US dollars as compensation for the use of Falcon Rig No. 54 
during the course of the venture in which the alleged injury occurred.231 
Courts have increasingly become more inclined to hold that the value of 
certain vessel contracts are properly included as pending freight for the purposes of 
the limitation fund. 
2. Supplemental Funds for Personal Injury or Death Claims on 
‘Seagoing Vessels’ 
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In the case of personal injury or death claims on ‘seagoing vessels,’ the assessed 
value of the vessel after casualty may be increased to $420US dollars per gross ton 
if the initial fund is inadequate to cover all claims.232 The supplemental fund is only 
available for payment of claims for personal injury and death. The term ‘seagoing 
vessels’ is defined in § 30506(a) and does not include ‘pleasure yachts, tugs, 
towboats, towing vessels, tank vessels, fishing vessels or their tenders, self-
propelled lighters, nondescript self-propelled vessels, canal boats, scows, car floats, 
barges, lighters, or nondescript non-self-propelled vessels.’233 In effect, the above 
named vessels become exempt from the $420US dollar per gross ton requirement; 
however, those vessels may still be entitled to limit liability to the value of the 
vessel post casualty plus pending freight.234 
 Furthermore, the court in In the Matter of Talbott Big Foot, Inc., stated that 
for a vessel to be ‘seagoing’ under § 183(b)235 and not exempted by § 183(f),236 the 
vessel must be intended to navigate in the seas beyond the nautical boundary237 in 
the regular course of its operations.238 The court can also take into account the 
design, function and capabilities of the vessel to examine if its intended purpose is to 
operate beyond the nautical boundary.239 
  3. Application of the ‘Flotilla Doctrine’ 
Another method or way of attempting to increase the value of the limitation fund is 
through the application of the ‘Flotilla Doctrine.’ The doctrine was invented by 
Judge Learned Hand in Standard Dredging Co. v. Kristiansen, which held that all 
vessels engaged in the same venture and under common ownership at the time of the 
injuries must be surrendered into the limitation fund.240  
 For example, in Drill Barge No. 2, the barge owner was engaged in the 
construction of a levee and used several barges to blast rock, dig the canal and build 
the levee.241 An explosion occurred on barge No. 2 and caused serious injuries to 
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five claimants, all of whom were employees of the barge owner.242 The U.S. 
Appellate Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling increasing the limitation fund 
from the original sum, the value of the exploded barge, to the value of the entire 
flotilla.243 
 Other courts have not universally accepted the holding by Judge Learned 
Hand in Kristiansen and have attempted to make a distinction between ‘pure tort’ 
cases and ‘contractual relationship’ cases.244 This distinction has arisen out of two 
U.S. Supreme Court cases. First, the Court in Liverpool held that whether or not two 
or more vessels under common ownership were involved in the same accident, only 
the vessel actively at fault must be surrendered.245 Then, the Court in Sacramento 
Navigation held that both a tug and barge together constituted a single vessel for 
limitation purposes because the vessels were performing under a contract of 
affrieghtment.246 
 As a result, the U.S. Circuit Courts have applied the ‘Flotilla Doctrine’ 
differently. A more modern test for whether a group of vessels operated as a unit or 
‘flotilla’ and should be surrendered is whether the vessels are subject to common 
ownership and engaged in a single enterprise.247 
 The end result is that if a person is injured on a vessel and a number of 
different vessels were operating under the same owner for the same venture, the 
injured person may be successful in increasing the value of the limitation fund to 
include all vessels in operation on the day of the accident by applying the ‘Flotilla 
Doctrine.’ 
  4. Third-Party Claims by the Vessel Owner 
It is well established that claims against third parties for damage to the vessel during 
the voyage (for example, collision or explosion damages) are part of the vessel 
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owner's interest in the vessel and are included as part of the limitation fund, even 
though hull insurance proceeds are not included in the limitation fund.248 
Benedict on Admiralty states that:249 
The shipowner's collateral rights against tortfeasors arising out of the 
accident or voyage must also be accounted for and added to the 
stipulation or assigned to the trustees. Such rights are usually 
collision damages. 
 
In Petition of Navigazione Libera Triestina, the limitation petitioner tried to 
avoid adding the value of the claim against the ship repairer to the limitation fund.250 
The court ultimately concluded that: 
To permit a shipowner to obtain reimbursement from a tortfeasor, 
and to prevent those funds from going to the damaged cargo owners, 
would seem unconscionable.251 
 
On the contrary, the court in Guillot v. Cenac Towing Co. held that claims 
against third party tortfeasors for indemnity or contribution for personal injury 
claims are not included in the limitation fund.252 The court stated: 
The theory of the limitation of liability Act is that the shipowner is 
not liable for damages or injuries occurring without its privity or fault 
beyond the value of the vessel (and pending freight) immediately 
after the casualty. Claims for indemnity, contribution, or both against 
third party alleged tortfeasors can in no sense add to ‘the amount or 
value of the interest of such owner’ in the vessel but rather were 
recoupment of losses from collateral sources.253 
 
Thus one can conclude that for third party claims by vessel owners to be 
included in the limitation fund, the claim must be considered as a part of the vessel 
owner’s ‘actual’ interest in the vessel and her pending freight. 
  5. Insurance Proceeds 
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It has been established that the proceeds of insurance, if any, received or due to the 
shipowner are not considered in determining the value of the limitation fund.254 This 
rule has been held to apply to both hull insurance and P & I insurance proceeds.255 
 Therefore, it is of no consequence what amount of insurance proceeds the 
vessel owner can potentially recover for the marine casualty or loss because such 
proceeds are not included in determining the limitation fund. 
B. South African Law 
As previously stated, § 261 of the MSA, 1951 governs limitation and liability is 
assessed according to the tonnage of a ship whether damaged or undamaged.256 The 
assessment of liability without taking into account the physical damage suffered by 
the ship was incorporated into § 261 via the old English law procedures for 
assessing liability.257 Section 261 prescribes a limitation formula based on tonnage 
that is to be applied in respect of claims for personal injury, loss of life and/or 
damage to property.  
1. Tonnage Limitation 
The limits prescribed in § 261 are determined by applying a unit of account for each 
ton of the ship’s tonnage. Section 262 determines how to calculate a ship’s tonnage 
and states that ‘for the purpose of § 261, the tonnage of a ship shall be her gross 
register tonnage.’258 The method and applicable law for measuring a ship’s gross 
register tonnage is set forth in § 262(3). Section 262 provides: in the case of a South 
African ship, tonnage is calculated according to the law of the Republic; in the case 
of a treaty ship registered elsewhere than the Republic, the law of the treaty country 
where the ship is registered is applied; and in the case of a foreign ship, the law of 
the Republic is used as along as the ship is capable of being measured under the law 
of the Republic.259 Section 262(4) also provides a method for determining the ship’s 
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tonnage where the ship is a foreign ship and is not capable of being measured under 
the law of the Republic.260  
The initial wording of § 261 provides liability limits and the units of 
accounting are an ‘an amount equivalent to two thousand six hundred and thirty-five 
gold francs or eight hundred and fifty gold francs for each ton of the ship’s tonnage’ 
depending on the type of claim.261 Section 261(4) defines a ‘gold franc as a unit 
consisting of 65,5 milligrams of gold of millesimal fineness 900,’ and ‘the value of 
such gold franc in South African currency is determined by the court seized of the 
case.’262 The gold franc unit of accounting was used to determine the limitation fund 
until § 261 was amended in September 1997.263 The 1997 amendment was enacted 
to remedy the complexity of calculating the limitation fund on the basis of the 
unstable and arbitrary gold franc standard.264 The difficulty in calculating the 
currency equivalent of a factor based on the gold franc was not just peculiar to South 
Africa, but was also one of the reasons behind the 1976 Limitation Convention 
initiative.265 The unit of accounting now includes a special drawing right266 and 
serves as the basis for calculating the limitation fund.267  
South African law also allows for the collective tonnage of more than one 
vessel when calculating the limitation fund under § 261.268 Where a single unit 
comprising of more than one vessel under common ownership causes damage or 
loss, the aggregate of both tug and tow may be used to calculate the tonnage.269 The 
ability of a claimant in South Africa to combine the tonnage of a number of vessels 
under common ownership and engaged in a single enterprise is in accord with the 
United States ‘Flotilla Doctrine’ and allows a claimant greater recovery rights. 
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2. Unit of Accounting – Special Drawing Rights 
The special drawing right (hereafter ‘SDR’) is an international reserve asset created 
by the International Monetary Fund (hereafter ‘IMF’) in 1969 to supplement the 
existing official reserves of member countries.270 The IMF was created in 1945 to 
help promote the health of the world economy.271 The IMF’s responsibilities include 
ensuring the stability of international monetary and financial systems including 
payments and exchange rates for national currencies in order to promote trade 
between countries.272 The SDR serves as the unit of account of the IMF and some 
other international organizations and its value is based on a basket of key 
international currencies.273  
Today, the SDR consists of the euro, Japanese yen, U.K. pound sterling and 
the U.S. dollar.274 The basket composition of currencies is reviewed every five years 
to ensure that it reflects the relative importance of currencies and market stability in 
the world’s trading and financial systems.275 The SDR is not a currency or a claim 
against the IMF but rather it is a potential claim on the freely usable currencies of 
IMF members.276 The U.S. dollar-value of the SDR is posted daily on the IMF’s 
website277 and it is calculated as the sum of specific amounts of the four currencies 
valued in U.S. dollars on the basis of exchange rates quoted each day in the London 
market.278 As of 31 March 2008, one SDR equaled 0.9576 euro, 0.0061 Japanese 
yen, 1.2120 U.K. pound sterling, 0.6115 U.S. dollar and 0.0750 South African 
rand.279 The value of the SDR tends to be more stable than that of any single 
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currency in the basket and the movement in exchange rates of any one currency will 
be partly or fully offset by movements in the exchange rates of other currencies.280 
3. Loss of Life and Personal Injury Claims versus Property 
Damage Claims 
 
Section 261 distinguishes between occasions resulting from loss of life and/or 
personal injury, property damage only and cases where both property damage and 
loss of life/personal injury occur.281 Depending on the type of claim, the formula in 
§ 261 for determining liability limits is expressed as a factor of the SDR x 
tonnage.282 The current formula for claims involving loss of life or personal injury 
only is 206,67 SDRs per gross registered ton, property loss or damage only is 66,67 
SDRs per gross registered ton and claims for both loss of life/personal injury and 
property damage are 206,67 SDRs per gross registered ton provided that claims for 
loss of life/personal injury have priority for the first 140 SDRs per gross registered 
ton, thereafter sharing a balance pari passu with property damage claims.283 It is 
important to note that SDR x tonnage formula under § 261 is the same for all sizes 
of ships284 and is at odds with the 1976 Limitation Convention.285 SDRs are 
converted into South African currency as determined by the IMF for the day on 
which judgment is given and can be proved by a certificate issued by the South 
African Treasury.286 
4. Time for Change? 
 The South African limitation legislation is still not in accord with more 
modern limitation practices and the amounts to which a shipowner or other party is 
entitled to limit is considerably lower than those countries in which the 1976 
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Limitation Convention applies.287 Furthermore, the South African Maritime Law 
Association has asked the government to amend the Merchant Shipping Act, 1951 
tonnage limitation provisions to comply with the different measurements of tonnage 
now required by the International Tonnage Convention, 1969 and to increase the 
levels of compensation available to claimants so that more uniform results are 
achieved.288 Many other sea-trading nations have already signed on to international 
conventions, more particularly the 1976 Limitation Convention and/or 1996 
Protocol to amend the 1976 Limitation Convention and when considering the 
international context in which shipping takes place, shipowners, claimants and/or 
other parties would be better equipped to resolve limitation issues if South Africa 
and even the United States acceded to such conventions.  
VII. International Conventions 
The right to limitation of liability is peculiar to maritime law and has roots dating 
back to the medieval sea codes.289 Despite the long history, the international 
community has not been successful in unifying the shipowners’ rights regarding 
limitation of liability.290 In the twentieth century, the Comite’ Maritime 
Internationale was founded in Brussels and several attempts were made to bring 
about international uniformity.291 The CMI drafted three limitation conventions, the 
first in 1924 did not receive widespread acceptance.292 The second attempt resulted 
in the 1957 Brussels Convention on Limitation of Liability.293 The 1957 Limitation 
Convention received much wider international acceptance than the 1924 
Convention; however, such maritime nations like the United States and Greece did 
not ratify the 1957 Limitation Convention.294 The final attempt was proposed in 
1976 through the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims. The 
1976 Limitation Convention failed in achieving the intended uniformity and this 
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failure can be attributed to the fact that the limitation concept is a creature of public 
policy.295 Wherefore, pubic policy can change over time and the differences in the 
economic and social standards within the various maritime nations make achieving a 
consensus on liability limits very difficult.296 
A. International Convention Relating to the Limitation of the Liability of 
Owners of Sea-Going Ships, 1957 
 
The 1957 Limitation Convention was signed in Brussels and came into force in 
1968.297 The 1957 Limitation Convention attempted to unify an entire body of 
substantive and procedural rules relating to limitation proceedings. The 1957 
Limitation Convention dealt with problems of when limitation applies, who is 
entitled to its benefits, what claims are barred from full recovery, establishing a 
limitation formula and a system for distributing the limitation fund.298  
 The principle article of the 1957 Limitation Convention is Article 1(1) which 
provides that the ‘owner of a sea-going ship may limit his liability…’299 The 
provision in Article 1(1) effectively applies only to vessels that are characterized as 
‘sea-going’300; however, Article 8 provides each contracting state with the right to 
decide what other classes of ships are to be treated in the same manner as sea-going 
ships under the Convention.301 Article 6(1-3) pertains to those persons entitled to 
benefit from limitation. The provisions of the 1957 Limitation Convention apply to 
‘the charterer, manager and operator of the ship’ as well as ‘master, members of the 
crew and other servants of the owner, charterer, manager or operator acting in the 
course of their employment.’302 If the masters or crewmen are also owners of the 
vessel, they may still limit if their own fault occurred while they were wearing their 
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master or crew hat, rather than acts they may have done or left undone as an owner, 
charterer, manager or operator.303 The 1957 Limitation Convention does not define 
the term ‘charterer’ and theoretically, it could include a bareboat charterer, time 
charterer, voyage charterer or even a space charterer.304 Under United States law, 
only shipowners and demise/bareboat charterers are entitled to limitation.305  
While the umbrella of protection for certain persons was expanded in the 
1957 Convention, only one limitation fund is made available to all those entitled to 
limitation arising from a distinct occasion.306 Furthermore, once a limitation fund 
has been constituted all claimants are enjoined from exercising any other rights 
against any other assets of the shipowner in respect of which the claim against the 
limitation fund lies.307 
 The types of claims affected by limitation are contained in Article 1(1) and 
for practical purposes can be divided into personal injury/death and property claims. 
Article 1(1)(a) allows for limitation for claims resulting from ‘loss of life, or 
personal injury to, any person being carried in the ship and loss of, or damage to, 
any property on board the ship.’308 Article 1(1)(b) further applies to: 
‘loss of life, ore personal injury to, any person, whether on land or on 
water, loss of or damage to any other property or infringement of any 
rights caused by the act, neglect or default of any person on board 
and/or not on board the ship for whose act, neglect or default the 
owner is responsible provided such act, neglect, or default occurs in 
the navigation or management of the ship.’309 
 
Therefore, the 1957 Limitation Convention allows limitation against all maritime 
and non-maritime claims and additionally, Article 1(3) extends limitation to cases in 
which ‘proof of negligence’ need not be introduced i.e. cases of absolute liability.310 
The amounts to which a shipowner may limit his liability vary according to the 
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classification of the claim as ‘personal’ or ‘property.’311 The principal way in which 
‘personal claims’ are given preferential treatment under the 1957 Limitation 
Convention is through the creation of different limits based on the tonnage of the 
vessel, exclusively for such claims.312  
However, the 1957 Limitation Convention is flawed in the sense that the 
funds calculated for ‘personal claims’ are based on the same unit of accounting 
regardless of the size of the vessel.313 This particular flaw results in inequities that 
become apparent when loss of life occurs on a larger ship with a smaller crew versus 
a smaller ship with a larger crew.314 The 1976 Limitation Convention attempted to 
alleviate these inequities for crew claims of smaller, but heavily crewed vessels by 
requiring more units of account per gross ton for smaller tonnages.315 
The different methods of calculating the limitation amount have been met 
with much criticism. The United States rule calculating the fund as ‘the value of the 
owner’s interest in the vessel and pending freight’316 has been described as one of 
the worst features of U.S. limitation law.317 Under the 1957 Limitation Convention, 
the limitation funds are calculated based on the net tonnage of the vessel: (1) 1,000 
francs if only property claims are involved; (2) 3,100 francs if only personal claims 
are involved; and (3) 3,100 francs if both types of claims are involved, with personal 
claims sharing exclusively as to 2,100 francs and to the extent not paid, sharing 
ratably with other claimants as to 1,000 francs.318 Article 3(6) defines the franc as a 
unit of gold319 and Article 3(5) further states that if ‘the tonnage of a ship is less than 
300 tons, the ship shall be deemed to be 300 tons.’320 
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 One legal commentator has suggested that the tonnage system, unlike value 
or value-plus-tonnage, promotes certainty necessary for a uniform limitation law.321 
Under the United States ‘value’ system, the variations in the methods used to 
appraise the vessel coupled with differing applications from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction can result in substantially discrepant limitation funds.322 Furthermore, 
the ‘value’ system partially depends on the state of the charter market while the 
tonnage system is more predictable and actually relieves courts of the lengthy and 
difficult task of determining a ship’s value.323  
 On the other hand, several flaws exist in the 1957 Limitation Convention’s 
tonnage plan. First, the tonnage plan fails to incorporate a ‘sliding’ scale mechanism 
flexible enough to adjust the fund ceiling to economic trends.324 The limitation fund 
is calculated in terms of a fixed quantity of gold which is to be translated into the 
currency of the forum nation at the commencement of the action.325 The gold 
standard creates additional problems because its value is not associated with 
economic markets but rather world prices that are determined by the United States’ 
willingness to purchase gold at a stated price.326 Secondly, the 1957 Limitation 
Convention fails to stipulate whether the gold franc is to be converted under the 
forum nation’s government or current market rate.327 
 Another key criticism of the 1957 Limitation Convention is the particular 
low standard of conduct and burden of proof328 a claimant must overcome in order 
to break or deny shipowners’ limitation. The 1957 Limitation Convention allows 
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limitation for general categories of claims, ‘unless the occurrence giving rise to the 
claim resulted from the actual fault or privity of the owner…’329 Furthermore, the 
United States standard provides limitation for a variety of claims provided those 
claims occurred ‘without the privity or knowledge of the owner.’330 As mentioned 
earlier, legal scholars have viewed the phrases ‘actual fault or privity’ and ‘privity or 
knowledge’ as a relatively poor standard for determining whether a shipowner is 
allowed to limit his liability. One legal scholar331 has been noted as saying ‘notions 
of privity or knowledge are empty containers into which the courts are free to pour 
whatever content they will.’332 Another legal scholar333 has noted that ‘some civil 
law countries require gross negligence, while in others simple negligence will defeat 
limitation. The differences between common law and civil law attitudes towards 
concepts of negligence and its degrees do not add certainty.’334 It is apparent that 
different jurisdictions will inevitably have varying interpretations regarding the 
standard of conduct and these variations add to the unpredictability of whether 
limitation will be available anywhere an investor of ships may be sued.335 The 
standard of conduct and burden of proof contained in the U.S. Limitation Act, South 
African Merchant Shipping Act of 1951 and the 1957 Limitation Convention are 
relatively low when compared the 1976 Limitation Convention and both do not 
support a universal standard by which claimants, shipowners, and insurers are 
afforded greater protections in return for higher limitation amounts. 
B. Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976 
Following the 1957 Limitation Convention’s attempt at achieving uniformity, the 
Comite’ Maritime Internationale proposed the 1976 Convention on Limitation of 
Liability for Maritime Claims. The 1976 Limitation Convention came into force on 
1 December 1986 although it was not accepted by several major trading nations 
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including the United States.336 The 1976 Limitation Convention proposed to attain 
international uniformity and insurability among maritime nations and it also sought 
to expand as well as change some principles set forth in the 1957 Limitation 
Convention. 
 Article 1(1) of the Convention expands the right to limit liability not only to 
shipowners’ but also salvors. Shipowner is defined as the ‘owner, charterer, 
manager and operator of a sea-going ship.’337 The term ‘charterer’ remains 
undefined thus leaving the door open to all types of ‘charterers.’338 The 1976 
Limitation Convention is still at odds with U.S. law which only permits limitation 
for shipowners and/or demise/bareboat charterers.339 Salvors are defined in Article 
1(2) as any person rendering services in direct connection with salvage operations 
and salvage is best defined by Professor Kennedy as: 
‘A service which confers a benefit by saving or helping to save a 
recognized subject of salvage when in danger from which it cannot 
be extricated unaided, if and so far as the rendering of such service is 
voluntary in the sense of being attributable neither to a pre-existing 
obligation nor solely for the interests of the salvor.’340 
 
An insurer of liability for claims subject to limitation is also afforded the rights of 
limitation341 and thus prevents claimants from filing direct actions suits against 
underwriters.342 The 1976 Limitation Convention further provides limitation 
protections for certain claims under Article 2 if brought by way of recourse or for 
indemnity under a contract.343 
 In addition, the claims subject to limitation have been expanded under the 
1976 Limitation Convention to include not only claims for loss of life/personal 
injury and property claims but also claims resulting from delay in carriage of cargo 
and certain salvage claims.344 Claims for damage resulting from oil pollution as well 
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as contribution in General Average are specifically exempted from limitation.345 
There is also a separate fund applicable to passenger claims and applies to persons 
carried on a ship under a contract of passenger carriage or who, with the consent of 
the carrier, is accompanying a vehicle or live animals which are covered by a 
contract for the carriage of goods.346 
 The 1976 Limitation Convention brought about significant improvements347 
in the limits of liability for certain claims. In exchange for an increased limitation 
fund, the 1976 Limitation Convention places a higher burden of proof on the 
claimant by requiring a showing ‘intentional or willful fault’ on the part of the one 
claiming limitation.348 Article 4 specifically states ‘a person shall not be entitled to 
limit his liability if it is proved that the loss resulted from his personal act or 
omission, committed with the intent to cause such loss, or recklessly and with 
knowledge that such loss would probably result.’349 Article 4 essentially replaces the 
‘privity or knowledge’ standard set forth in the 1957 Limitation Convention and 
U.S. Limitation law and is more aligned with standards for breaking limitations 
contained in several other maritime conventions.350 While the language does not 
establish ‘an unbreakable right to limit,’ it provides a better standard for courts to 
apply when examining a claimant’s right to limitation. 
 The 1976 Limitation Convention’s limitation fund is based upon tonnage, 
not post-casualty value, and all assets of the shipowner, including insurance 
proceeds are available to satisfy the fund amount.351 The limitation formula consists 
of multiplying the gross tonnage of the vessel by the unit of account listed in Article 
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8.352 Gross tonnage is calculated in accordance with the tonnage measurement rules 
contained in the International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 
1969.353 The 1976 Limitation Convention’s unit of account was upgraded to a 
Special Drawing Right (‘SDR’), whose value is determined daily by the 
International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’) on the basis of a basket of currencies.354 
Article 8 also provides a method for calculating the SDR if the state party is not a 
member of the IMF and/or if the state party’s local laws do not permit the unit of 
account to be based on the SDR, such units can correspond with the gold franc.355 
The SDR ensures uniformity in the valuation of currencies because the value of a 
fixed number of SDR’s in terms of any convertible currency will be identical at any 
given point in time.356  
However, one criticism of the Convention’s unit of account is that 
expressing the limits in SDRs gives little or no protection against world inflation.357 
Furthermore, the 1976 Limitation Convention does not establish procedures or other 
mechanisms for easy adjustment of the limits of liability to counter future 
deterioration of monetary values.358 In 1996, a Diplomatic Conference was called by 
the International Maritime Organization (‘IMO’) to discuss increasing problems 
revealed in the 1976 Limitation Convention and subsequently, the committee 
adopted the 1996 Protocol to the 1976 Limitation Convention.359 
 The 1996 Protocol sought to increase the limits set forth in Article 6, 7 and 8 
of the 1976 Limitation Convention as well as address the salvors’ rights to limitation 
for salvage claims brought under Article 13 and 14 of the 1989 Salvage 
Convention.360 One of the principle reasons for the United States failure to adopt the 
1976 Limitation Convention was the belief that the limits of liability based on 
tonnage were too low, particularly in the case of low tonnage vessels carrying large 
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crews or passengers.361 Amounts of compensation for maritime claims for loss of 
life or personal injury and property claims were significantly increased effective 
May 2004, following the adoption of the 1996 Protocol.362 The 1996 Protocol was 
opened for signatures from 1 October 1996 to 30 September 2007.363 The 1996 
Protocol can come into force either through ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession and some of the following sea-trading nations have signed on: Australia, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom.364 Furthermore, a summary of the status of conventions as of 29 February 
2008 provides that 51 contracting states have signed on to the 1976 Limitation 
Convention accounting for 48.92 per cent of the world’s tonnage and 28 contracting 
states have signed on to the 1996 Protocol accounting for 23.42 per cent of the 
world’s tonnage.365   
The 1996 Protocol increased the lowest limitation band from 500 tons to 
2,000 tons; however, the Protocol did not alter the provision in Article 15(2) 
allowing a state party to declare lower limits of liability for ships less than 300 tons, 
if such state party so desires.366 Applying the new minimum tonnage and increased 
limits means that the owner of a 500-ton vessel will face increased liability for loss 
of life, personal injury and property claims. Furthermore, the 1996 Protocol replaced 
Article 7(1) of the 1976 Limitation Convention and increased the maximum limit of 
liability for passenger claims from 46,666 SDRs to 175,000 SDRs multiplied by the 
certified passenger-carrying capacity of the vessel.367 This increase effectively 
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removed the 25 million SDR cap and allows passengers’ to be more adequately 
compensated for their claims.368 
While the 1976 Limitation Convention and subsequent adoption of the 1996 
Protocol can be viewed as improving the rights of all parties in a limitation 
proceeding, some points still remain unclear.369 On the other hand, most of the 
world’s tonnage has signed on to either the 1976 Limitation Convention or the 1996 
Protocol and the United States and South Africa’s failure to follow suit evidences a 
failure in their own limitation practices.370 The replacement of the ‘privity or 
knowledge’ standard is a significant improvement and shipowners are better 
equipped to pay higher awards in exchange for reducing a claimants’ ability to break 
limitation. The United States current limitation regime is out of line with the global 
shipping community and does not produce uniform results when compared to the 
1976 Limitation Convention and/or 1996 Protocol. There is still a need to unify the 
international limitation regimes with modern policy concerns.371 The availability of 
insurance to cover certain losses in marine casualty calls new purposes into play and 
limitation of liability laws should be drawn to take advantages of economic 
efficiencies and economies of scale in procuring and paying for insurance to cover 
potential losses.372 
VIII. Should there be International Uniformity through a New Convention on 
Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims? 
 
The question of uniformity in the shipping industry has been met with different 
answers and perspectives over the last few decades.  The word ‘uniform’ or 
‘uniformity’ is actually defined as ‘of similar form or character to another or others’ 
or ‘the state or quality of being uniform.’373 More importantly, the question of 
uniformity in the context of limitation of liability regimes can be interpreted as 
applying a universal standard for assessing liability to those nations conducting trade 
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with each other. Shipping accounts for 90 per cent of the world’s transportation of 
goods and countries will invariably face issues relating to losses that occur during 
ocean voyages.  
 The concept of globalization has also become increasingly important over 
the last few years. Seaborne trade has grown exponentially since the 1970’s and the 
adoption of containerization.374 As a result, shipping is considered one of the four 
cornerstones of globalization.375 The growth of world trade and internationalization 
of economies have made it essential for shipping companies to extend their market 
coverage globally.376 Increased efficiency in port and shipping services have also 
made it easier to buy and sell merchandise goods, raw materials and components 
almost anywhere in the world.377 The development of the European Union has 
effectively created a single market through a standardized system of laws which 
facilitate the movement of people, goods, services and capital between member 
states.378 The creation of economic and regional trade partners also support the 
concept of globalization. Major world players like the United States, European 
Union and Japan are currently generating much of the world’s trade but one can not 
ignore the recent exploits of China as it seeks to import oil resources and raw 
materials from Africa.379 Since 2000, China-Africa trade has quadrupled in volume, 
such materials like crude oil from Angola, platinum from Zimbabwe, cooper from 
Zambia, tropical timber from Congo, and iron ore from South Africa are finding 
their way onto foreign ships and foreign ports.380  
While the increase in trade and communication between countries is 
inevitable as world economies grow, one must ask ‘Should there be international 
uniformity through a new convention on limitation of liability for maritime claims?’ 
One example of uniformity transpired in 1993 when the International Maritime 
Organization adopted the International Safety Management Code (hereafter ‘ISM 
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Code’).381 The ISM Code was designed to provide an international standard for the 
safe operation and management of vessels as well as to enhance pollution 
prevention.382 The idea of creating a new international limitation convention is not 
far removed and was previously attempted three times by the international maritime 
community. The question above poses the question ‘should’ and the maritime 
community through the efforts of the IMO and CMI have attempted to move 
forward and draft new conventions amenable to all sea-trading nations but countries 
must be willing to give up some autonomy. Uniform and fair results could be 
achieved by openly and clearly specifying the interests to be protected383 and the 
criteria for commercial shipping could be defined thereby alleviating unsatisfactory 
results in countries like the United States and South Africa where limitation 
practices are not in accord with modern practices and policy concerns.384 With the 
import of globalization and technological advancement in shipping and trade 
between countries, a uniform international standard to assess limitation of liability 
practices would better serve the international maritime community by leveling the 




The differing regimes regarding limitation of liability for shipowners has presented 
many questions in the international arena. The development of the 1924, 1957, 1976 
Limitation Conventions and subsequent protocols thereto have all attempted to 
develop a regime that is amenable to all sea-trading nations. The problem that the 
international shipping community has faced is finding a balance in power between 
the major sea-trading nations and those countries still seeking full autonomy. The 
rights of all parties involved in maritime ventures must be protected regardless of 
the size and strength of its participants. The United States and South African 
limitation practices can be characterized as ‘cargo-friendly,’ particularly because of 
the relatively low limits for breaking limitation. Under these regimes, shipowners 
are faced with greater liabilities and courts have been inconsistent in clearly defining 
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the concepts of ‘privity and/or knowledge’ for which shipowners actions are to be 
judged. The more recent development of the 1976 Limitation Convention and 1996 
Protocol have reverted back to the traditional and commercial principles of 
protecting the shipowner from facing the full wrath of total liability for losses 
associated with marine ventures and is more in line with the concept of insurance 
and allocation of risk. The international shipping community has also experienced a 
revolution as many shipping companies are merging with global partners to provide 
more efficient means of transporting goods; globalization is occurring as sea-trading 
countries are importing and exporting raw materials from all corners of the world to 
develop their own economies; and many countries are adopting international 
conventions as a means reducing judicial ambiguity within the courts. However, the 
1976 Limitation Convention and 1996 Protocol have not resolved all limitation 
issues. Many issues like ranking of claims, release of arrested property, jurisdiction 
and conflict of laws still need to be addressed; nevertheless, the members of the 
IMO and CMI are well equipped to discuss and resolve such questions. What 
remains to be seen is the drafting and adoption of a new international regime for 
limitation of liability and how will it handle the today’s integrated and complex 
world of shipping and those future developments that will surely occur over time.  
 
